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Corn east Corp. v. Behrend
11-864

Ruling Below: Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182 (3rd Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 2012
WL 113090 (U.S. 2012).
Customers brought an antitrust class action against Comcast alleging that it harmed a class of
people consisting of cable subscribers in the Philadelphia region by improperly eliminating
competition, raising entry barriers to potential competition, and increasing prices at unreasonable
levels, while depriving subscribers of lower prices that would have come from effective
competition, in violation of federal anti-trust laws. Plaintiffs asserted that Comcast caused these
injuries by certain acquisitions and swaps of customers with other providers in the Philadelphia
region in exchange for customers in other regions. The United States District Comi for the
Eastern District Pennsylvania celiified class. Comcast appealed.

Question Presented: Whether a district court may certify a class action without resolving
whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to
show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis.

Caroline BEHREND; Stanford Glaberson; Joan Evanchuk-Kind; Eric Brislawn

v.
COMCAST CORPORATION; Comcast Holdings Corporation; Comcast Cable
Communications, Inc.; Comcast Cablecommunications Holdings, Inc.; Comcast Cable
Holdings, LLC, Appellants.
United States Comi of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed on August 23,2011
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge

I.

For the reasons that follow, we hold that the
Court did not exceed its permissible
discretion in determining that Plaintiffs
established by a preponderance of evidence
that they would be able to prove through
common evidence (1) class-wide antitrust
impact (higher cost on non-basic cable
programming),
and
(2)
a common
methodology to quantify damages on a
class-wide basis. Accordingly, we will
affirm.

A.
Plaintiffs, SIX non-basic cable television
programming
services
customers
of
Comcast, brought a class action antitrust suit
against Comcast in 2003. They alleged
violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1, for "imposing horizontal
territory, market and customer allocations by
conspiring with and entering into and
implementing unlawful swap agreements,
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arrangements or devices," and section 2 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.c. § 2, on theories
of
monopolization
and
attempted
monopolization. The Complaint alleged
anti competitive conduct in the Philadelphia
area and the Chicago area. As only the
alleged conduct in Philadelphia is before us,
we focus on the nature of the class and the
allegations in Philadelphia.
The Complaint alleged that Comcast had
perpetrated an anticompetitive "clustering
scheme." According to the Complaint,
Comcast eliminated competition by (1)
acquiring competitors in the Philadelphia
market and (2) swapping with competitors
cable systems and subscribers outside of the
Philadelphia market for cable systems and
subscribers within the Philadelphia market.
The Complaint also alleged that Comcast
engaged in conduct intended to exclude
competition from overbuilder RCN Telecom
Services, Inc. ("RCN"), by denying it access
"Comcast
Sportsnet,"
requll'lng
to
to
enter
non-compete
contractors
agreements,
and
inducing
potential
customers to sign up for long contracts with
special discounts and penalty provisions in
the areas where RCN intended to overbuild.
As a result of its clustering, Comcast
allegedly harmed the class by eliminating
competItlOn, ralSlng entry barriers to
potential competition, maintaining increased
pnces for cable serVIces at supracompetItIve
levels,
and
depriving
subscribers of the lower prices that would
result from effective competition.

II.
... Reviewing a district COlllt's ceitification
of a class, we examine the elements of the
class's claims "through the prism" of Rule
23. The elements of the claims before us are
(1) a violation of the antitrust laws (here,

sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act), (2)
individual Injury resulting from that
violation, and (3) measurable damages.
Individual injury, also known as antitrust
impact, "is critically important for the
purpose of evaluating Rule 23(b)(3)'s
predominance requirement because it is an
element of the claim that may call for
individual, as opposed to common, proof."
At the class certification stage, Plaintiffs'
burden is "to demonstrate that the element
of antitrust impact is capable of proof at trial
through evidence that is common to the
class rather than individual to its members."

III.
Comcast devotes much of its energy to
contending that the District Court exceeded
its discretion in holding that Plaintiffs had
established common evidence of antitrust
impact.

A.
We will affirm the District Court's
conclusion that the Philadelphia Designate
Market Rea (DMA) is a relevant geographic
market "susceptible to proof at trial through
available evidence common to the class."
264 F.R.D. at 160.
The relevant geographic market is a
component of substantive antitrust law. For
antitrust claims analyzed through the rule of
reason, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the
defendant possessed market power in the
relevant geographic market. For per se
claims, plaintiffs need not establish a
geographic market. Additionally, "direct
proof of monopoly power does not require a
definition of the relevant market."
Defining the relevant geographic market,
however, is an issue of the merits. At the
class certification stage, a court need only be
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satisfied
that
issues-including
the
definition of a geographic market-will be
capable of proof through evidence common
to the class. If the plaintiffs allege per se
claims, they may still need to persuade the
district court that, in the event defining the
relevant geographic market becomes
necessary, it is capable of common proof.
B.

First, we perceive no legal error in the
District Court's reasoning. Procedurally, it
conducted the required "rigorous analysis"
by examining in depth the expert opinions
on both sides and setting forth its
conclusions. Substantively, the Court
determined that "the record evidence shows
that consumers throughout the DMA can
face similar competitive choices and suffer
the same alleged antitrust impact resulting
from Comcast's clustering conduct in the
Philadelphia DMA." 264 F.R.D. at 160.
Comcast contends that the Court failed to
apply the consumer demand substitutability
test, which defines the relevant geographic
market as "that area in which a potential
buyer may rationally look for the goods or
services he seeks." We determine otherwise:
the Court's analysis of the relevant
geographic market for purposes of class
ce11ification comp0l1ed with our precedent.
"[IJdentification of the relevant geographic
market is a matter of analyzing
competition." Defining it "is a question of
fact to be detennined in the context of each
case in acknowledgment of the commercial
realities of the industry being considered."
In these decisions of our Court, one of
which has commanded our attention for
almost thirty years, we relied on two
Supreme Court cases to develop this
standard: United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966), which held that
the relevant geographic market under the

Sherman Act was "not the several local
areas which the individual stations serve, but
the broader national market that reflects the
reality of the way in which they built and
conduct their business," and Tampa Electric
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320,
327, 332 (1961), which defined the relevant
geographic area for § 3 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 3, as "the market area in which
the seller operates, and to which the
purchaser can practicably turn for supplies"
or as the area in which suppliers "effectively
compete."

c.
The District Court's determination-that
consumers "face similar competitive
choices" in the Philadelphia DMA as a
result of Comcast's alleged clustering
conduct-is consistent with the above
standards because it considers both where a
buyer may rationally look for goods and the
commercial reality of the industry.
Comcast's insistence that the geographic
market must be the individual household (as
the only place where a consumer can
"comparison shop") ignores that the
geographic market must be "economically
significant," and may be premised on "the
commercial realities of the industry being
considered," the area where suppliers
"effectively compete" or the broader market
reflecting the reality of conducting business.
We therefore discern no legal error in the
District Court's analysis ....
E.

Second, we recognize ample evidence in the
record supporting the District Court's
factual findings underpinning its market
determination, which precludes us from
reversing those findings as clearly
erroneous.

266

Simply put, the District Court determined by
a preponderance of the evidence that, when
addressed on the merits, the class may be
able to prove through common evidence that
the relevant geographic market is the
Philadelphia DMA.
IV.
Comcast hinges its next line of arguments
on the District Court's final celtification:
"Proof of antitrust impact relative to such
claims shall be limited to the theory that
Comcast engaged in anti competitive
clustering conduct, the effect of which was
to deter the entry of overbuilders in the
Philadelphia DMA." According to Com cast,
the District COUlt made clearly erroneous
findings of fact by relying on Plaintiffs'
expert, Dr. Williams, in support of the
certified theory of antitrust impact.

A.
On appeal, Comcast constructs a four-tiered
argument to support its objections. First, it
contends that Plaintiffs cannot show classwide antitrust impact based on potential
overbuilding by any of the "Transaction
parties." According to Comcast, the
evidence demonstrated there was no actual
competition between the Transaction patties;
Plaintiffs therefore must show that the
challenged conduct eliminated potential
competition. Tn Comcast's view, the record
evidence reflects that no Transaction parties
had taken any affirmative steps to overbuild
and, consequently, there was no potential
competition to eliminate. Second, Comcast
contends that Plaintiffs identified only RCN
Telecom Services, Inc., as attempting to
overbuild in the Philadelphia DMA. The
evidence establishes, according to Comcast,
that RCN was not going to overbuild as a
result of its own financial woes, not as a
result of any alleged activity on the part of

Comcast. Third, as the argument goes,
because there was no record evidence
demonstrating
actual
or
potential
competition, the theoretical OpInIOnS
indicating otherwise rendered by Plaintiffs'
expert, Dr. Williams, were clearly
erroneous. Comcast disputes at many levels
Dr. Williams's methodology and results in
his "market structure" and "market
performance" opinions. Fourth, Comcast
adds that any evidence of anti competitive
conduct specific to Delaware County could
not serve as evidence of class-wide impact
for the Philadelphia cluster.
B.

Plaintiffs respond to each level of Comcast's
position. First, citing many portions of the
IS
record,
they
assert that there
"overwhelming" record evidence that
Comcast's clustering of the Philadelphia
DMA deterred and reduced overbuilding
competition, resulting in antitrust impact
(higher cable prices) for all class members.
According to the class, the record
demonstrates: clustering deters overbuilding,
the swaps and acquisitions eliminated
competition,
Multi-System
Operators
("MSOs") actually do overbuild one
another, Comcast and other MSOs look to
one another's prices to set their own, and the
MSOs chose affirmatively not to compete.
Second, Plaintiffs contend that Comcast
raises a merits issue by asking the Court to
examine whether Comcast's conduct in fact
prevented RCN from overbuilding in more
areas than it did. In any event, they state that
the record evidence demonstrates RCN had
the intent and capital to overbuild the
Philadelphia market. Third, Plaintiffs state
that Dr. Williams's theoretical model plainly
shows common evidence of class-wide
impact; Comcast's contention that Dr.
Williams's opinions do not prove antitrust
impact is one for the jury to decide on the
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merits. Fourth, the evidence related to
Delaware County "adds to and illustrates"
the common evidence of Comcast's
anti competitive clustering conduct.
V.

We begin the analysis of these contentions
by focusing on the precise inquiry:
Plaintiffs' burden at the class
certification stage is not to prove the
element of antitrust impact, although
in order to prevail on the merits each
class member must do so. Instead,
the task for plaintiffs at class
certification is to demonstrate that
the element of antitrust impact is
capable of proof at trial through
evidence that is common to the class
rather than individual to its members.
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311-312.
Many of Comcast's contentions ask us to
reach into the record and detennine whether
Plaintiffs actually have proven antitrust
impact. This we will not do. Instead, we
inquire whether the District Court exceeded
its discretion by finding that Plaintiffs had
demonstrated by a preponderance of the
evidence that they c01lld prove antitrust
impact through common evidence at trial.

Comcast has not carried its burden.
Plaintiffs provided evidence at the
certification hearing that tended to show that
Comcast's clustering (through swaps and
acquisitions) reduced competition, deterred
the entry of overbuilders, and resulted in
higher cable prices for the entire class. This
evidence displays "some hue of credibility"
and bears a rational relationship to the
Comi's finding.
All of this evidence demonstrates that
Comcast's alleged clustering conduct indeed

could have reduced competition, raised
barriers to market entry by an overbuilder,
and resulted in higher cable prices to all of
its
subscribers
in
the
Philadelphia
Designated Market Area. Based on this
evidence, we determine that the antitrust
impact Plaintiffs allege is "plausible in
theory" and "susceptible to proof at trial
through available evidence common to the
class."
VI.

Comcast's other contentions are equally
unpersuasive. There is conflicting evidence
as to the role Comcast played in RCN
Telecom Services, Inc.'s decision to not
overbuild futiher in the Philadelphia DMA.
Plaintiffs highlight record evidence that
RCN had the intent and capital necessary to
overbuild the Philadelphia market. Comcast
contends instead that RCN faced financial
woes, as a result of which it abandoned its
plans to overbuild. The District Court
credited Plaintiffs' explanation: "What Dr.
Teece considers 'unlikely,' Dr. Singer
considers to be the common evidence of
antitrust impact, namely that RCN was
stymied in its efforts by Comcast's
predatory behavior." Again, we are satisfied
that the District Court's finding was not
clearly erroneous. "Where there are two
permissible views of the evidence, the
factfinder's choice between them cannot be
clearly erroneous."
Similarly, Comcast contends that Dr.
Williams's analysis and methodology was
flawed for various reasons, including the
allegation that it was unsuppOlied by any
actual evidence. We disagree. As detailed
above, there was ample evidence that
clustering conduct can deter entry of
overbuilders and result in higher cable
prices.
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Comcast also asserts that every individual
had one or two options from which to
choose cable and that consequently only the
name of the provider changed, not the
This
assertion
number of options.
completely overlooks the nature of the
claims of the class: by clustering, Comcast
was able to deter the entry of overbuilders,
which resulted in higher prices for all nonbasic Comcast subscribers. And Plaintiffs
provided evidence that clustering can have
this effect.
As to Comcast's remaining contention that
the District Court erred by crediting as
evidence of class-wide impact the alleged
conduct targeted at RCN Telecom Services,
Inc., in Delaware County, we agree with the
class that the alleged conduct is relevant to
establishing class-wide impact. We have
explained that "courts must look to the
monopolist's conduct taken as a whole
rather than considering each aspect in
isolation."). Alleged specific conduct aimed
at preventing the entry of an overbuilder
anywhere in the Philadelphia DMA supports
Plaintiffs' allegations of Comcast's ability to
maintain supra-competitive prices for the
entire market.

VII.
At bottom, Comcast misconstrues our role at
this stage of the litigation. Comcast would
have us decide on the merits whether there
was actual or potential competition among
the Transaction parties, the reason RCN
Telecom Services, Inc., abandoned the
Philadelphia market, and whether Plaintiffs'
experts proved antitrust impact. Weare not
the jury. Although in Hydrogen Peroxide we
heightened the inquiry a district court must
perform on the issue of class certification,
nothing in that opinion indicated that class
certification hearings were to become actual
trials in which factual disputes are to be

resolved.
In sum, we hold that the District Court's
determination-that
Plaintiffs
have
demonstrated by a preponderance of the
evidence that they can establish class-wide
antitrust
impact
through
common
evidence-did not exceed its discretion.

VIII.
To satisfy another portion of the
predominance requirement, Plaintiffs must
establish that the alleged damages are
capable of measurement on a class-wide
basis using common proof.

A.
The
District
Court
examined
the
methodology, conclusions, and criticisms of
the experts on both sides, before providing
its conclusions. Because on appeal Comcast
renews the arguments it made to the District
Court, we set f01ih each side's position in
the District Court and the Comi's response.
Plaintiffs' damages expert, Dr. McClave,
concluded that the prices in the Philadelphia
market were consistently and substantially
higher than the prices in areas of effective
competition. His econometric analysis
demonstrated that the alleged antitrust
impact was class-wide, because the prices
were elevated above competitive levels
across all class members and for the entire
time period. For his methods, Dr. McClave
constructed "but-for" prices against which to
compare the prices Com cast charged in the
Philadelphia DMA. "But-for" prices are
those that would have existed absent the
alleged
anti competitive
conduct.
To
construct the "but-for" prices, he first
selected comparable "benchmark" counties
around the country by applying two
"screens" to determine whether the counties
represented a level of competition similar to
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what Comcast would have faced in the
Philadelphia market absent its alleged
anticompetitive conduct. It is impOliant to
understand these two screens. The first
screen-the "market share screen" or "40%
screen"-required that the county have a
Comcast subscriber penetration rate of less
than 40%. Dr. McClave chose 40% because
it represented the approximate midpoint of
Comcast's
penetration
rate
in
the
Philadelphia DMA (between approximately
20% in 1998 and 60% from 2003 through
2008). He chose this number also because it
allowed for growth during the class period
but focused on markets where Comcast was
likely to have less market power than it does
in the Philadelphia market. The second
screen-the "Direct Broadcast Satellite
screen", or "DBS screen"-required that the
county be in a Designated Market Area
where the penetration level for Alternative
Delivery Systems (which essentially
includes DBS, but also master antenna
systems and multipoint distribution systems)
was at or higher than the national average of
Alternative Delivery Systems penetration
rates in Comcast markets. Using data from
the counties that fit the two screens, Dr.
McClave performed a multiple regression
analysis to compare actual prices in the
Philadelphia DMA to the estimated "butfor" prices. He then applied the overcharge
percentage to the relevant revenue obtained
by Comcast for expanded basic service in
the Philadelphia market during the class
period to reach a final conservative
estimated overcharge value: $875,576,662.
Comcast's experts, Dr. Teece and Dr.
Tasneem Chipty, contested several parts of
Dr. McClave's methodology, and questioned
his results. First, they challenged both
benchmark screens used by Dr. McClave.
Regarding the "DBS screen," Dr. Teece
asserted that Dr. McClave erroneously chose
the higher national Direct Broadcast

Satellite penetration rate, instead of the
lower regional rate predicted by Plaintiffs'
experts Dr. Singer and Dr. Williams. The
District Court rejected the critique, stating
that Dr. McClave "used his national average
DBS penetration screen as a descriptor of
typical competitive market conditions," and
was not attempting to predict the Direct
Broadcast Satellite penetration rate of the
Philadelphia DMA Regarding the "market
share screen," Dr. Chipty contended that
because Comcast was present in only a few
counties in 1999, its actual market share was
much higher in the counties where it was
and 0% where it was not; as a result, the
less-than-40% penetration rate provided an
inappropriate screen. The District COUli
rejected the criticism as unsuppOlied by the
record, stating that Dr. Chipty should have
presented evidentiary data to show that 40%
was an incorrect midpoint estimate or
average rate. The Court also noted that the
40% screen was supported by the evidence
as Comcast's approximate share of the
Philadelphia DMA at the midpoint of the
class period.
Second, Dr. Chipty faulted Dr. McClave's
model for failing to consider properly
demographic variables among the counties:
specifically, for omitting the variables of
population density and the number and type
of households. The District Court credited as
well-supported Dr. McClave's response as
to why he omitted population density: it is
correlated with medium household income
(which he included) and using it as well as
household income would create confounding
and unreliable results.
Third, Dr. Chipty criticized Dr. McClave's
model for comparing list prices for
expanded basic cable in the Philadelphia
DMA against the benchmark counties. She
opined that Dr. McClave's model did not
take into account the significant number of
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promotions and discounts offered to
Comcast customers. The Comt rejected Dr.
Chipty's models as "suffer[ing] significant
flaws It stated that Dr. McClave's model
accounted for discount prices in the formula
(not
model)
when
he
multiplied
anticompetitive overcharge by Comcast's
relevant revenues. Accordingly, by adding
discount prices to the model as well, Dr.
Chipty's model doubly counted the discount.

exceeded its discretion in accepting
Plaintiffs' proposed damages calculation
methodology. Its arguments are recast
verSIOns of those rejected by the District
Court.
Plaintiffs remind us that the District Comt
already thoroughly considered and rebutted
each of the points that Comcast now raises.
IX.

Fourth, the District Court rejected Dr.
Chipty's attempt to impeach Dr. McClave's
model by using it to calculate damages for
basic cable prices, instead of expanded basic
cable. The Court explained that Dr.
McClave's model aimed to analyze only
expanded basic cable, because Comcast
alters its prices at the expanded level, so
"any application of the McClave model to
[basic cable prices] explains nothing."
Comcast does not contest that mling.
Fifth and finally, the Court asked the pmties
after the hearing how to interpret Dr.
McClave's damages model if it credited at
least one, but not all, of Dr. Williams's four
theories of antitmst impact. It determined
that Dr. McClave's damages model was still
viable, even if it rejected some theories of
antitmst impact, explaining that Dr.
McClave selected benchmarks to isolate the
effect of anticompetitive conduct, and that
his use of the DBS screen was "entirely
Williams's DBS
unrelated" to Dr.
foreclosure theory. The Comt concluded that
Dr. Williams's theories of antitmst impact
were not relevant to Dr. McClave's methods
of choosing benchmarks because "[a]ny
anti competitive conduct is reflected in the
Philadelphia DMA price, not in the selection
of the comparison counties."
B.
Comcast contends that the District Court

We pause to identify the forest for the trees.
If allowed to proceed to trial, the class must
establish that the injury it suffered from the
violation of the antitmst laws is measurable.
The usual measure in an overcharge case "is
the difference between the illegal price that
was actually charged and the price that
would have been charged 'but for' the
violation multiplied by the number of units
purchased." Given the inherent difficulty of
identifying a "but-for world," we do not
require that damages be measured with
certainty, but rather that they be
demonstrated as "a matter of just and
reasonable inference."
The inquiry for a district court at the class
certification stage is whether the plaintiffs
have demonstrated by a preponderance of
the evidence that they will be able to
measure damages on a class-wide basis
using common proof. Some variation of
damages among class members does not
defeat certification. Complex and individual
questions of damages, however, weigh
against finding predominance
On appeal, the inquiry narrows. Because the
District Comt held that Plaintiffs had
established they could measure damages
through common proof, we examine
whether that determination was beyond the
Comt's discretion. Having identified the
forest of law, we proceed to scmtinize the
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timber that Comcast faults as rotted.

of Dr. McClave's methodology was clearly
erroneous.

A.

Comcast contends that Dr. McClave's model
cannot isolate damages for individual
theories of harm, and that it therefore cannot
distinguish between lawful and unlawful
competition.
We are not persuaded by Comcast's
argument. To measure damages, Dr.
McClave used screens to select and average
benchmark counties against which to
compare the actual Philadelphia market. The
screens themselves were not intended to
calculate damages, but instead to construct
"but-for"
an
estimated
competitive
Philadelphia market (a market absent the
alleged anti competitive conduct).

At the outset, we agree with the class that
the heart of Comcast's arguments are attacks
on the merits of the methodology that have
no place in the class certification inquiry.
Even if we were to overrule as clearly
erroneous the District Court's findings on all
four contested pieces of Dr. McClave's
methodology-i.e., modify both of Dr.
McClave's screens, add population density
as a variable, and incorporate Dr. Chipty's
proposed method for calculating discountsonly the final amount of estimated damages
would change. Comcast's assertions do not
impeach the District Court's ultimate
holding that damages are capable of
common proof on a class-wide basis.

x.
As a result, if the class proves at trial that
Comcast engaged
in anticompetitive
behavior, it can use the constructed "butfor" market to measure the anti competitive
impact on the class members. At the class
certification stage we do not require that
Plaintiffs tie each theory of antitmst impact
to an exact calculation of damages, but
instead that they assure us that if they can
prove antitrust impact, the resulting damages
are capable of measurement and will not
require labyrinthine individual calculations.
We are satisfied that Plaintiffs' damages
model meets this burden.

The District Court certified the class for
resolution of four claims. Comcast contends
that the District Court erred by celiifying the
following claim:
Whether
Defendants
conspired
with
competitors, and whether Defendants
entered into and implemented agreements
with competitors, to allocate markets,
territories, and customers for cable
television serVIces; and l-vhether slIch
cond1lct is a per se violation, or whether it
constitutes a restraint of trade in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.c. § 1.

B.

Comcast's remammg arguments contest
specific parts of Dr. McClave's damages
methodology. These contentions are a
renewal of those it made to the District
Court, each of which the Court rejected. For
those determinations to be beyond the
Court's discretion, Comcast must convince
us that the COUli's acceptance of the pieces

According to Comcast, the District COUli
lacked any legal authority to celiify a per se
claim based on the class's allegations.
This is a merits issue beyond the scope of
our Rule 23(f) jurisdiction. Comcast
misconstrues
the
District
Court's
certification order. The COUli certified the
class and stated that one of the questions to
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be litigated is whether there has been a per
se violation. It did not declare that a per se
violation had occurred. Appeals taken
pursuant to Rule 23(f) do not furnish the
proper vehicle to address the merits of
Plaintiffs' antitrust claims. Comcast's
request to have us declare on the merits that
Plaintiffs cannot establish a per se antitrust
violation is beyond the scope of the
certification decision from which Comcast
appeals pursuant to Rule 23(f). Accordingly,
we do not reach this contention.

***
We have considered carefully all the
contentions presented by the parties.
Plaintiffs have demonstrated that this case
can proceed as a class action. Comcast has
not carried its burden to convince us
otherwise. Accordingly, we will AFFIRM in
all respects the District Court's Order
certifying the class.

JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in
the judgment part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the Majority's conclusion,
though not its reasoning, with respect to the
question of antitrust impact, and I therefore
join in holding that the District Court did not
abuse its discretion when it determined that
Plaintiffs could establish antitrust impact
through evidence common to a class
comprIsmg Comcast cable television
customers in the Philadelphia DMA. But
because I conclude that damages cannot be
proven using evidence common to that
entire class, I would vacate the certification
order to the extent it provides for a single
class as to proof of damages, and I would
remand the case to the District Court to
consider whether the class can be divided
into subclasses for the purpose of proving
damages. I therefore respectfully dissent in
part.

Much confusion has been caused in this case
by the conflation of two distinct concepts:
the antitrust concept of "relevant geographic
market," which has traditionally been
defined as the smallest area within which a
monopolist can exercise market power, and
the class action concept of a "class
definition," which gives the parameters of a
set of plaintiffs as to whom the elements of a
claim can be proven usmg common
evidence. Because, in this case, the class
definition includes a geographic component,
the term "relevant geographic market" has
been used equivocally by the parties, the
District Court, and the Majority to describe
both the area affected by antitrust impact
and the area within which potential class
members reside-the latter area being what I
will call, for lack of a better term, the "class
region." The problem with that equivocal
usage is that the relevant geographic market
and the class region are not necessarily
coterminous. Even if we assume that, within
the Philadelphia DMA, there are many
distinct geographic markets that are relevant
for antitrust purposes, as Com cast argues,
that does not mean that Plaintiffs cannot
prove, by common evidence, that Comcast's
acts caused antitrust impact within all of
them. As a theoretical matter, class proof
can cover multiple relevant geographic
markets, and, indeed, other COUl1s of
Appeals have so held.
The Majority is correct that defining the
relevant geographic market is not a task we
need to undertake at this stage, but that is
not because the task takes us into the merits.
It is rather because, regardless of whether
there are one or many relevant geographic
markets associated with the Philadelphia
DMA, the question before us at this juncture
is whether there is some class, in this case
defined geographically, that can be shown,
through common evidence, to have
experienced elevated prices as a result of
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reduced overbuilding because of Comcast's
clustering.

II. Whether Damages Can Be Proven
Using Evidence Common to the Class
I part ways with the Majority entirely when
it comes to class-wide proof of damages.
The only evidence supporting Plaintiffs'
claim that damages can be proven using
evidence common to the class is the expert
opinion of Dr. McClave. But, as detailed
hereafter, Dr. McClave's testimony is
incapable of identifying any damages caused
by reduced overbuilding in the Philadelphia
OMA. Consequently, his testimony is
irrelevant and should be inadmissible at
trial, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmace1lticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993),
as lacking fit. Thus, it cannot constitute
common evidence of damages.
Our precedent explains that Rule 702 and
Daubert impose three requirements for
admission of expert testimony: the expert
must be qualified, the expert's methodology
must be reliable, and the expert's proffered
testimony must fit the particular case. Like
any relevancy determination, the question of
fit is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Here,
Dr. McClave's opinion fails the requirement
of "fit" because it is disconnected from
Plaintiffs' only viable theory of antitrust
impact, i.e., reduced overbuilding, and, thus,
the proffered expeli testimony cannot help
the jury determine whether reduced
overbuilding caused damages. It was,
consequently, an abuse of discretion for the
District Court to consider Dr. McClave's
opinion as demonstrating that damages
could be proven using evidence common to
the class.

A. Dr. McClave's Benchmark Counties
Do Not Reflect "But For" Conditions in

the Philadelphia DMA
To identify his benchmark counties, Dr.
McClave used three "screens." While those
screens might, if properly employed, have
helped identify relevant benchmark counties
in a case involving antitrust impacts beyond
limited overbuilding, they fail to identify the
"but for" conditions that are relevant to what
is now the only impact of Comcast's
allegedly anti competitive conduct, namely
the deterrence of overbuilding. They,
therefore, cannot help identify damages
caused by that impact.

B. Damages Are Not Capable of Being
Proven By Evidence Common to the
Entire Class
Central to Dr. McClave's damages model is
the conclusion that the price of cable
television service in any given franchise area
is affected by the relative market shares of at
least three entities: overbuilders, OBS
providers, and incumbent cable providers.
All else being equal, for example, areas that
are overbuilt will have lower prices than
areas that are not overbuilt, and areas with
high DBS penetration will have lower prices
than areas with low DBS penetration. For
that reason, Dr. McClave's model identifies
benchmark counties by screening for the
relative market shares of those three entities.
While I do not accept the manner in which
Dr. McClave has measured the relative
shares of those entities in the "but for"
Philadelphia DMA, I accept the premise that
the relative shares have significant influence
on the price of cable television service.
If price does vary with the changes in
relative share within a franchise area,
however, it is hard to see how those 650
franchise areas can simply be treated as
average for purposes of proving damages.
The record indicates that, on the contrary,
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the "but for" market shares of overbuilders,
DBS providers, and incumbent providers
would vary, sometimes significantly, from
franchise area to franchise area.
This primary flaw in Dr. McClave's
methodology-using a single set of
assumptions for the entire Philadelphia
DMA-cannot be fixed merely by altering
his model. It seems to me that no model can
calculate class-wide damages because any
damages-such as they may be-are not
distributed on anything like a similar basis
throughout the DMA. Rather, where some
class members might reside in a franchise
area that would have been 50 percent
overbuilt for the entire class period and
other class members might reside in a
franchise area that would have been only 5
percent overbuilt and only for a single year,
or not overbuilt at all, it strains credulity to
believe that the damages suffered by those
individuals would all be the same as a result

of reduced overbuilding. Yet Dr. McClave's
model treats them as though they are the
same, as would any model attempting to
calculate damages on an average class-wide
basis.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I would vacate
the District Court's certification order to the
extent it provides for a single class as to
proof of damages and remand the case for
the District Court to address whether Dr.
McClave's model could, in fairness, be
revised to accurately reflect the conditions
that would have existed in the Philadelphia
DMA in the absence of any reduction in
overbuilding caused by clustering. I would
further ask the District Court to consider
whether the class certified for proving
antitrust impact can be divided into
appropriate subclasses for purposes of
proving damages.
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"Will Daubert Become Part of Class
Certification Hearings?"
JDS1Ipra

July 16,2012
Kirk Jenkins
In the closing days of its term, the Supreme
Court announced that it had granted
certiorari in Com east Corporation v.
Behrend, setting up what is certain to be a
major battle over expert testimony and class
certification hearings.

Behrend arises from what appears to be the
largest certified class in history-more than
two million former and current subscribers
to Comcast's cable services in the
Philadelphia metropolitan area. According
to the complaint, Com cast violated Sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by pursuing a
strategy of anticompetitive clusteringdeliberately buying up cable systems in
geographic areas where Comcast already has
a significant foothold while selling or
trading away cable systems where the
carrier's
holdings
were
less
concentrated. According to the plaintiffs,
Comcast's clustering deterred entry by
"overbuilders"-companies
who
deliberately enter a market where another
cable provider is already established.
Comcast's celi petition in Behrend set the
case up as a straightforward application of
the Court's landmark 2011 decision in WalMart Stores, Inc. v. D1Ikes, where the Court
announced that class certification is proper
only if the trial court is satisfied, "after a
rigorous analysis," that the requirements for
class certification have been proven-even
if plaintiffs will be required to prove the
same propositions again in order to prevail
on the merits at trial. Dukes was handed
down against a background of earlier lower
cOUli holdings applying a lesser standard,

often certifying classes based only on a
determination that class representatives
would likely be able to establish the
prerequisites for class certification later, at
trial. These cases took their cue from the
Supreme Court's apparent bar in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacq1lelin against inquiring into
the merits at the class certification stage. But
the Dukes cOUli dispatched Eisen in a
footnote, dismissing the relevant language as
"purest
dictum." Comcast
asked
for
summary reversal in Behrend, arguing that
the Third Circuit had ignored Dukes and
resurrected Eisen, disregarding Comcast's
various merits arguments on a variety of
Rule 23 issues.
The Court seems to have been deadlocked
about what to do with Behrend for several
weeks, relisting the case from conference to
conference
no
less
than
seven
times. Ultimately, the justices reached a
compromise, granting celi on a single
question: whether a district court could
certify a class without deciding whether the
plaintiffs
had
introduced
admissible
evidence, including expert testimony, to
show that awarding damages on a class-wide
basis is practical. In other words, when an
expert's testimony is crucial to the plaintiffs'
Rule 23 arguments-which it will generally
be in antitrust, if not in most class actionsmust the parties and the court have a fullblown Da1lbert proceeding before a class
can be certified?
"We are really expecting this to be the big
one," Ankur Kapoor of Constantine Cannon
told the Philadelphia Inquirer after celi was
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granted. "The legal journals will be writing
about it for years." Lawyers at Mayer Brown
LLP agreed, writing that the issue is of
"extraordinary importance to businesses
defending themselves against class actions
of all stripes." Seyfarth Shaw's Workplace
Class Action blog agreed, writing that the
opinion in Behrend "could have wideranging impact on class actions, including
those in the workplace arena." Cozen
O'Connor's Class Action Defense Review,
on the other hand, predicted that Behrend
would not have the profound impact of
Dukes and the Court's other class action
landmark of 2011, AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion.
There's no question a Circuit split has
developed in the years immediately before
and after Dukes on the question of how to
handle expert testimony. As the petitioners
in Behrend pointed out, the Seventh Circuit
has held at least twice that district cOUlis
must make a definitive ruling on the
Da1lbert inquiry at the class celiification
stage if the plaintiff's compliance with Rule
23 depends on the admissibility of the
expeli's testimony-most recently in
Messner
v.
Northshore
University
Healthsystem, and earlier in American
Honda Motor Co. v. Allen. The Ninth
Circuit endorsed a full-blown Da1lbert
analysis in Ellis v. Costco Wholesale
Corp. The Eleventh Circuit agreed in Sher v.
Raytheon Co., following Allen in an
unpublished opinion.
But on the other hand, there is the Eighth
Circuit's opinion in In re Zurn Pex
Plumbing Products Liability Litigation, filed
only two weeks after Dukes. The Eighth

Circuit failed to take up the Supreme
COUli's heavy hint in Dukes that Daubert
was fully applicable to class certification
hearings,
affirming
a
district
court's "tailored" determination that expert
testimony was sufficiently reliable "in light
of the existing state of the evidence" to
justify celiifying a class. After all, the
Eighth Circuit pointed out, class certification
was "inherently tentative," and a full
Daubert inquiry could not be justified at
such an early stage.
Given the Supreme Court's dicta in Dukes
and the apparent compromise at the cert
stage, it seems likely that the Court will
reject the Eighth Circuit's approach in Zurn
Pex, as it should. Class certification is a
crucial stage in class action litigation,
particularly in antitrust cases. Designing an
econometric model which reliably predicts
damages on a classwide basis is an
enormous challenge and, as the cert petition
in Behrend observes, "most cases will be on
the fast track to settlement shortly after class
certification." Although plaintiffs may press
for more discovery pre-certification if courts
are required to conduct full-blown Daubert
inquiries before certification, this seems like
a reasonable price to pay in order to defeat
meritless class actions early. Although some
have worried that courts which approve
expert testimony at the certification hearing
will decline to reconsider at the close of
discovery, this seems unlikely, given the
discovery and factual development likely to
occur in the interim. All in all, Behrend is
likely to be an important battle at the
Supreme Court, and a worthy sequel to the
Court's opinion in D1lkes.
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"Behrend v. Comcast: 3 rd Circuit Affirms Class
Certification in Antitrust Case"
LexisNexis Communities
November 15,2011
Louis M. Solomon
Our immediately prior posting addressed the
issue of how a single case in a multiparty,
multidistrict litigation raising industry-wide
antitrust claims was plucked out and sent to
arbitration. How a plaintiff manages around
that result is a question not just of
international litigation practice but for the
corporate or transactional lawyer/draftsman
to avoid as well.
How are antitrust claims faring these days in
overcoming another major procedural
hurdle, that of class certification? Behrend,
et al. v. Comcast Corp., et al., No. 10-2865
(3d Cir. Aug. 2011), addresses the issue
extensively. And despite the Supreme
Court's decision in Waf-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), which we
discussed here, the Third Circuit affirmed
the District Court's certification decision of
antitrust claims.
The claims arise out of alleged series of
transactions that increased Comcast's share
of the multichannel video programming
distribution services offered III the
Philadelphia
area
through
alleged
anticompetitive "clustering". After the Third
Circuit initially denied interlocutory appeal
(permissible under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 in
certain cases) [enhanced version], the
District Court held a four-day evidentiary
hearing from both fact and expert witnesses,
considered as part of that 32 expert reports,
and examined deposition excerpts and
documents. The challenges on appeal
centered around whether there was sufficient
evidence of class-wide antitrust impact,
whether the damages methodology was
acceptable, and whether the District Court's

certification of what the defendants'
characterized as a per se antitrust claim was
clear error. The Third Circuit rejected all
challenges.
Among other things, the Circuit rejected the
invitation to decide the merits of the
litigation, without discussing whether what
the District Court did was tantamount to that
trial nonetheless. Admittedly, recent classaction jurisprudence "heightened the inquiry
a district cOUli must perform on the issue of
class certification," nothing III the
controlling cases requires "actual trials in
which factual disputes are to be resolved."
The Court of Appeals differentiated
requiring plaintiffs to establish the elements
of certification by a preponderance of the
evidence from requiring plaintiffs to "prove
their case at the class certification stage."
The Court also noted "recent scholarship,"
which "uniformly has expressed concern
over the trend towards
converting
certification decisions into mini trials." The
Court did however quote Oliver Wendell
Holmes's classic comment from The Path of
the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897): "For
the rational study of the law the black-letter
man may be the man of the present, but the
man of the future is the man of statistics and
the master of economics".
The Circuit also rejected the suggestion that
Wal-Mart supported the claim that the
damages model proffered by plaintiffs'
expeli could be "safely disregarded". The
Court of Appeals, without more discussion,
found that Wal-Mart "involved a massive
discrimination class action and ... neither
guides nor governs the dispute before us".
278

"Federal Judge Recertifies Class in Comcast Antitrust Case"
Law. com Network
January 19,2010
Shannon P. Duffy
A federal judge has once again certified a
class action antitrust suit against cable
television giant Comcast Corp., declaring
that the plaintiffs have succeeded in
satisfying a new, stricter class action test
imposed last year by the 3rd U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals.
The suit, Behrend v. Comcast Corp., alleges
the company set out to establish a monopoly
in the Philadelphia market in order to
increase prices once it had eliminated all the
competition.
Comcast and its would-be competitors, the
suit alleges, struck a series of deals in which
they "swapped" assets and customers so that
each company would have "clusters" of
markets.

In May 2007, U.S. District Judge John R.
Padova handed down a decision that
certified a class of Comcast subscribers in
the 16-county Philadelphia metropolitan
area, including six Pennsylvania counties,
two Delaware counties and eight New Jersey
counties.
But
the
legal
landscape
changed
significantly in 2008 when the 3rd Circuit
handed down its ruling in In re Hydrogen
Peroxide Antitmst Litigation, and a team of
lawyers for Comcast, led by Darryl May of
Ballard Spahr, responded by urging Padova
to vacate his May 2007 ruling.

in some cases, an inquiry into the expert
witnesses offered by both sides to determine
whether the plaintiffs are truly able to meet
the requirements of Rule 23.
Now, in an 86-page opinion, Padova has
certified the case again, but the opinion
shows that the judge has significantly
pruned the plaintiffs' theories.
"Having rigorously analyzed the expert
reports, as well as the testimony presented
by the parties during a four-day evidentiary
hearing, we conclude that the class has met
its burden to demonstrate that the element of
antitrust impact is capable of proof at trial
through evidence that is common to the
class rather than individual to its members,
and that there is a common methodology
available to measure and quantify damages
on a class-wide basis," Padova wrote.
Padova once again appointed two firmsHeins Mills & Olson in Minneapolis and
Susman Godfrey in Dallas-to serve as colead counsel for the class.
Comcast is likely to take an immediate
appeal-a move that could stall the suit,
which was filed in 2003, for a year or more.
Under Rule 23(t) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, decisions on class
certification motions are immediately
subject to discretionary appellate review.

In his order, Padova defined the class to
Padova agreed and later held a four-day
hearing that was designed to meet the new,
more rigorous test for class certification
required by Hydrogen Peroxide, including,

include "all cable television customers who
subscribe or subscribed at any time from
December 1, 1999 to the present to video
programming services (other than solely to
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basic cable services) from Comcast, or any
of its subsidiaries or affiliates in Comcast's
Philadelphia cluster."
The Philadelphia "cluster" is defined in the
order to include: Berks, Bucks, Chester,
Delaware, Montgomery and Philadelphia
counties in Pennsylvania; Kent and New
Castle counties in Delaware; and Atlantic,
Burlington,
Camden,
Cape
May,
Cumberland, Gloucester, Mercer and Salem
counties in New Jersey.
Pad ova also specifically certified four issues
to be litigated:
• Whether Comcast conspired with
competitors and entered into agreements
with competitors "to allocate markets,
territories, and customers for cable
television services," and whether such
conduct "is a per se violation, or whether it
constitutes a restraint of trade in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act."
• Whether Comcast "unlawfully attempted
to monopolize, or unlawfully possess and
willfully acquired or maintained monopoly
power in, the Philadelphia area cable market
with respect to cable television services in
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act."
• Whether the actions alleged to violate
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act
"caused prices for cable television services
in the relevant markets to be atiificially high
and not competitive."

• Whether the plaintiffs and members of the
class were injured by the alleged conduct.
But, significantly, Padova rejected the
plaintiffs' theory that Comcast's clustering
strategy made it profitable for Comcast to
deny access to its regional spOtis
programming content, Comcast SportsNet
(CSN) Philadelphia, to DirecTV and
EchoStar, its direct broadcast satellite
competitors,
resulting
in
decreased
penetration by the satellite providers in the
Philadelphia market, which, in turn, led to
increased expanded basic cable prices to all
class members.
In the battle of the experts on that point,
Pad ova said, Comcast was the clear winner
and demonstrated that the plaintiffs' theory
was invalid.
Padova said the plaintiffs' expert "fails to
recognize that Comcast has maintained its
policy of distributing CSN Philadelphia only
to wireline providers of video services since
launching CSN Philadelphia in 1997, well
before formation of the Philadelphia
cluster."
And the decision not to license the satellite
providers, Padova noted, "occurred before
the class period."
Lead plaintiffs attorney David R. Woodward
of Heins Mills & Olson did not return calls
seeking comment. Comcast's lawyer, Darryl
May of Ballard Spahr, declined to comment.
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"Squeezing Class Actions"
SCO TUSb log
August 30, 2011
Scott Dodson

In their prominent Civil Procedure
casebook, Rick Marcus, Marty Redish, Ed
Shelman, and Jim Pfander describe the 1966
amendments to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure as "bring[ing] about great
changes in class action practice." Those
amendments were designed with two related
ideas in mind. First, litigating in bulk could
save costs for both plaintiffs and defendants,
and it could be more efficient for courts.
Second, the cost savings to plaintiffs,
coupled with expanding the scope of a
grievance to many different class members,
could encourage private litigation to enforce
public ends. The class action, in other
words, was designed to be a public benefit,
saving litigant and judicial resources while
encouraging salutary litigation.
One wouldn't guess that from reading recent
Supreme Court decisions. Today, the class
action is decidedly persona non grata. The
Supreme Court's 2010 Term in particular
evinces both skepticism of and hostility to
class actions. Justice Antonin Scalia was the
main frontman, writing two major opinions
restricting class actions and issuing a stay by
himself in another.
What intrigues me is that the assault on class
actions is coming so forcefully from all
sides. In Waf-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, the
Court narrowed the availability of Rule
23(b)(2), with the effect of shuttling many
discrimination and civil-rights classes into
the more-difficult-to-sustain mechanism of
Rule 23(b)(3). D1lkes also enhanced the
requirement of commonality under Rule
23(a)(2), which applies to all class actions in
federal coUti, by holding that a class must

demonstrate that each class member's claim
must depend upon a common contention
capable of class-wide resolution. D1lkes thus
confronts
the
federal
class-action
mechanism directly.
Other cases, however, come at class actions
from a different angle. In Philip Morris USA
Inc. v. Scott, Justice Scalia stayed a statecourt class action against several tobacco
companies on behalf of all Louisiana
smokers alleging that the companies
defrauded the plaintiffs by distorting public
knowledge about the addictive effects of
nicotine. The Louisiana courts had credited
the plaintiffs' theory, certified the class
under state law, and entered a judgment of
almost $250 million against the defendants.
Justice Scalia nevertheless stayed the
judgment until the defendants could seek
celiiorari in the Supreme Court because, in
his view, the Louisiana coUtis had used the
class-action device to eliminate the
defendants' opportunity to contest the
element of reliance on an individualized
basis. Justice Scalia reasoned that such an
effect implicated constitutional due-process
concerns. Scott, then, reflects one Justice's
invocation of the federal Due Process Clause
to constrain state class-action relief.
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the
CoUti held that the Federal Arbitration Act
prohibits states from conditioning the
of
certain
arbitration
enforceability
agreements on the availability of class-wide
arbitration procedures. By lifting state
regulation, the decision enables private
parties to restrict class procedures under the
aegis of the FAA. In effect, Concepcion
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permits "even encourages" defendants,
through private arbitration agreements, to
eliminate the class mechanism altogether.
Class actions have been under attack for
some time, but usually on their own terms,
and with some apologies by the Supreme
Court, as in the famous class-action cases of
General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, Amchem
Prod1lcts, Inc. v. Windsor, and Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp. But this Term's assault
comes from all sides: directly narrowing
Rule 23, imposing federal constraints on
state
class-action
mechanisms,
and
encouraging the privatization of procedure.
And the pervading tenor of the Court's
opinions suggests that class actions ought to
be disfavored and used only in rare cases.
These features of the COUli's agenda lead
me to make three observations.
First, and most obviously, the Court's
decisions probably will reduce the numbers
and scope of class actions in both state and
federal court. As analogous support,
consider the effect of the Supreme Court's
Amchem and Ortiz decisions from 1997 and
1999,
respectively.
These
decisions
narrowed the scope of Rule 23(b)(3) and
overturned class settlements of asbestosrelated claims. One might reasonably expect
the numbers of mass-tort class-action cases
to fall in the wake of Amchem and Ortiz.
That seems to have happened; a recent study
by Brian Fitzpatrick found that of the 688
federal class settlements in 2006 and 2007,
almost none was a mass tmi case. If
Amchem and Ortiz had such an impact on
mass-tOli classes, consider what kind of an
impact last Term's Wal-Mart decision will
have on all federal class actions.
To compound the effect, state courts and
class-arbitration agreements are no longer
safe havens for plaintiffs who fear a new
restrictiveness in federal courts. The Class

Action Fairness Act of 2005 reduces the
number of potential classes that can dodge
removal to federal court. For those classes
that properly remain in state court, Scott
presages greater federal oversight of state
procedures. And for those classes that the
law undeniably allows, Concepcion permits
defendants broad leeway to contract around
those laws through arbitration agreements.
Ultimately, the effect on class actions is an
empirical question, but even in the absence
of data, it is not a stretch to wonder if we are
hearing the death knell of the class action.
Second, the Court's recent class-action
decisions coincide with a shift in procedure
theory from liberality to restrictiveness. Bob
Bone once called for more procedure theory,
and perhaps the Supreme COUli is
responding to that call. If so, the class-action
decisions, with their anti-class sentiments,
support what Ben Spencer has observed as a
new "restrictive ethos" of civil procedure
that elevates efficiency over court access.
Third, the Supreme Court is charting this
course on its own. Although it routinely
enteliains proposals and conducts studies,
the Rules Advisory Committee has not
seriously tinkered with Rule 23, and its basic
structure remains identical to its original
1966 form. Congress rarely intervenes in
federal procedure, and although it did pass
the Class Action Fairness Act to expand the
removability of state class actions, it did not
purport to change the standards for class
certification in state or federal court or
otherwise constrict the availability of the
class mechanism overall. Others, such as
Steve Burbank, Kevin Clermont, Arthur
Miller, and Steve Yeazell, have criticized
the Court for failing to defer to the
rulemakers and to Congress in other areas of
civil practice. Whether their criticisms apply
to the Court's recent class-action decisions I
leave to others to pursue; I mean here to
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point out that the Court's class-action
decisions may be part of a broader mistrust
in the rulemaking and legislative processes
to solve perceived problems with civil
litigation.
Whatever one thinks of the Court's agenda
from a normative perspective, we ought to
be aware of how its decisions affect the
direction of procedure. In a narrow sense,

decisions like Waf-Mart and Concepcion
can be seen as part of a recent trend cabining
the use of class mechanisms. But in a
broader doctrinal context, they may signify a
macro shift in procedural theory toward
efficiency, with system-wide doctrinal
implications. And in a structural context,
they may reveal a new role for the Supreme
Court in civil-procedure development as
leader, rather than as follower.
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"Comcast Settles, May Avoid Supreme Court"
The National Law J01lrnal
July 27,2012
Tony Mauro

Next term's big class-action case before the
Supreme Court is Comcast Corp. v.
Behrend, set for argument on Nov. 5, one
day before Election Day.
The justices are expected to decide whether
a district court can certify a class without
delving into the merits and determining
whether there is enough admissible evidence
to show that class-wide damages could be
awarded.
Whether the case will still be on the docket
in November is an open question and
depends on the status of a possible
settlement in the underlying antitrust dispute
between Comcast and 2 million of its
Philadelphia-area subscribers.
Twelve days before the Supreme COUli
granted review in the case, paliies for both
sides informed a district cOUli judge in
Philadelphia on June 13 that they "have
reached a tentative agreement to resolve."
According to a recent story in The Legal
Intelligencer, a sibling publication to The
National Law J01lrnal and Daily Report,
plaintiffs attorneys say the Supreme COUli
case could be moot, though the settlement
has not been approved by the judge.
Plaintiffs also told the district cOUli that
Com cast lawyers should have informed the
Supreme Court about the settlement.
Miguel Estrada, lead counsel for Comcast
before the Supreme Court, said III a
statement, "the case is not moot."
The Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher patineI'
added, "I have no reason to believe that the

case will, or should, be dismissed before or
after argument."
Estrada also insisted, "nothing has occurred
that would warrant any filing with the
Supreme Court, before certiorari was
granted or since." He added, "Plaintiffs have
filed a motion in district court trying to head
off Supreme Court review, but we have
opposed that motion." Barry Barnett of
Susman Godfrey in Dallas, the counsel of
record for the plaintiffs before the Supreme
Court, declined comment.
Alleged anti-competitive transactions by
Com cast to increase its hold on multichannel
video programming in the Philadelphia area
are at the center of the class action.
The complaint, brought by a group of
Comcast subscribers, alleged the company
engaged in an unlawful "clustering scheme"
through business deals to eliminate
competition and deprive customers of lower
prices.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit
last
summer
upheld
class
certification after declining to consider the
merits at the certification stage. The court
certified a plaintiffs' class of all cable
television customers who subscribe or
subscribed to Com cast, beginning in
December 1999, other than solely basic
cable services.
Invoking last year's Supreme Court ruling in
Wal-Mart v. D1Ikes as well as Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing
class actions, Judge Ruggero Aldisert wrote,
"the factual and legal underpinnings of Wal284

Mart-which
involved
a
maSSIve
discrimination class action and different
sections of Rule 23-are clearly distinct
from those of this case. Wal-Mart, therefore,
neither guides nor governs the dispute
before us."

in other high-profile cases but is not
involved in the Supreme Court litigation,
said the dispute tests whether the high
court's decision in Waf-Mart will stick.
Walker is co-chair of the appellate practice
at Wiley Rein.

In his petition to the high comi, Estrada,
who is co-chair of the firm's appellate and
constitutional law practice group, said the
case presents the high court the chance to
resolve "an issue of great significance" in
class-action litigation.

"In Waf-Mart, Justice [Antonin] Scalia said
evaluation of class certification requires a
rigorous analysis that may often overlap
with the merits of the case," Walker said this
week. "But in the Comcast matter, the Third
Circuit said, 'We can't engage in an inquiry
under Rule 23 that goes to the merits. '"

"[I]t would further allow the Court to
continue its long-standing practice of
ensuring that lower courts apply procedural
rules, including Rule 23, with appropriate
rigor," Estrada wrote.
Helgi Walker, who has represented Comcast

Walker said she thinks Wal-Mart will
control how Comeast is resolved in the high
court and that the Third Circuit will be
reversed. "I think the American business
interest community would be suppOliive of
Comcast's position," she said.
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Amgen v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds
11-1085
Ruling Below: Connectic1lt Retirement Plans & Trust F1lnds v. Amgen, Inc., 660 F.3d 1170 (9th
Cir. 2011), cert granted, 2012 WL 692881 (U.S. 2012).
On behalf of purchasers of Amgen stock, Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds brought a
securities fraud class action regarding Amgen's misrepresentations from 2004 to 2007 about the
safety of anemia drugs Aranesp and Epogen, which inflated the price of Amgen's stock. Under
Section 1O(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), a plaintiff must show that
reliance on the alleged misrepresentation is common to the class to obtain class certification in a
misrepresentation action. The district court granted class-celiification in this action and held that
Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds could invoke the fraud-on-the-market theory, with
rebuttal of that presumption being held for trial. The COUli of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, holding that at the time of class-celiification, the plaintiff in a securities fraud class
action invoking the fraud-on-the-market presumption "need only allege materiality with
sufficient plausibility to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion."
Question Presented: (1) Whether, in a misrepresentation case under Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 10b-5, the district court must require proof of materiality before celiifying a
plaintiff class based on the fraud-on-the-market theory; and (2) whether, in such a case, the
district court must allow the defendant to present evidence rebutting the applicability of the
fraud-on-the-market theory before certifying a plaintiff class based on that theory. (Breyer, 1.,
recused)

CONNECTICUT RETIREMENT PLANS AND TRUST FUNDS, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
AMGEN INC.; Kevin W. Sharer; Richard D. Nanula; Roger M. Perlmutter; George W.
Morrow, Defendants-Appellants.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided November 8, 2011
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge
To obtain class certification III a 10b-5
securities fraud case, the plaintiff, as
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3), must convince the district court
that the element of reliance is common to
the class. The Supreme COUli has held that

this can be done in an appropriate case by
invoking
the
"fraud-on-the-market"
presumption-the principle that the market
price of a security traded in an efficient
market reflects all public information and
therefore that a buyer of the security is
presumed to have relied on the truthfulness
of that information in purchasing the
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security. Were it not for the fraud-on-themarket presumption, a plaintiff seeking class
certification would be required to show the
impossible-reliance by each individual
prospective class member who bought the
stock.
What must a plaintiff do to invoke the fraudon-the-market presumption in aid of class
certification? Today we join the Third and
Seventh Circuits in holding that the plaintiff
must (l) show that the security in question
was traded in an efficient market (a fact
conceded here), and (2) show that the
alleged misrepresentations were public (a
fact not contested here). As for the element
of materiality, the plaintiff must plausibly
allege-but need not prove at this
juncture-that
the
claimed
misrepresentations were material. Proof of
materiality, like all other elements of a lObs claim, is a merits issue that abides the trial
or motion for summary judgment. Likewise,
of
the
fraud-on-the-market
rebuttal
presumption, at least by showing that the
alleged
misrepresentations
were
not
material, is a matter for trial or summary
judgment, not a matter to be taken up in a
class certification motion.
In this case, the plaintiff plausibly alleged
that several of the defendants' public
statements about Amgen's pharmaceutical
products were false and material. Coupled
with the concession that Amgen's stock
traded in an efficient market, this was
sufficient to invoke the fraud-on-the-market
presumption of reliance. The district court
did not abuse its discretion in certifying the
class.
I. Background

Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust
Funds brought this securities fraud action
against biotechnology company Amgen Inc.

and several of its officers, alleging that, by
misstating and failing to disclose safety
information about two Amgen products used
to treat anemia (a red blood cell deficiency),
they violated Sections 1O(b) and 20( a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, IS U.S.C.
§§ 78j(b), 78t(a), and Rule 10b-S, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.1 Ob-S.
The complaint alleges four actionable
misstatements. First, Amgen supposedly
downplayed the FDA's safety concerns
about its products in advance of an FDA
meeting with a group of oncologists.
Second, Amgen allegedly concealed details
about a clinical trial that was canceled over
concerns that Amgen's product exacerbated
tumor growth in a small number of patients.
Third, Amgen purportedly exaggerated the
onlabel (that is, for FDA-approved uses)
safety of its products. And fOUl1h, Amgen
allegedly misrepresented its marketing
practices, claiming that it promoted its
products solely for onlabel uses when it in
fact promoted significant off-label usage, in
violation of federal drug branding statutes.
Those alleged misstatements and omissions,
according to the complaint, inflated the price
of Amgen's stock when Connecticut
Retirement purchased it. Later, corrective
disclosures allegedly caused Amgen's stock
prIce to
fall,
InjUrIng Connecticut
Retirement.
District
II.
The
Certification Order

Court's

Class

Connecticut Retirement moved In the
district court to certify the action as a class
action under Federal Rule ofCivii Procedure
23(b)(3) on behalf of all purchasers of
Amgen stock between the date of the alleged
misstatements and omissions and the date of
the corrective disclosures. Rule 23(b)(3)
permits a party to maintain a class action if
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the Rule 23(a) prerequisites are satisfied and
"the court finds that the questions of law or
fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior
to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy."
Fed.R.Civ.P.23(b)(3).
The district cOUli found that the Rule 23(a)
prerequisites were satisfied and that
common questions predominated. Of the
elements of a claim under Section 1O(b) and
Rule 10b-5, the district cOUli found that the
following questions were common to the
class:
whether Amgen
made false
statements, whether those statements were
material, whether those statements were
connected with the sale of securities,
whether those statements were intentionally
false, and whether those statements caused
the class members' losses. The district court
fmiher found that although the class
members' losses differed depending on
when and how much they bought, the losses
would be simple to calculate.
The district comi also ruled that the
remaining element-reliance-was common
to the class because the class could avail
itself
of
the
fraud-on-the-market
presumption of reliance. That doctrine, first
approved by the Supreme Court in Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), rests
on the efficient capital market hypothesis:
The price of a stock traded in an efficient
market fully reflects all publicly available
information about the company and its
business. See 485 U.S. at 241-42, 244-45,
246-47. If the stock price did not reflect a
piece of publicly available information, the
logic goes, then investors would have a
strong incentive to buy the stock (if the
information were positive) or sell it (if
negative); in an efficient market, that
activity would drive the stock price up or

down until it fully reflected the information.
Anyone who buys stock at the prevailing
market price is presumed to have relied on
that price-and, by extension, each piece of
publicly available information it reflects-as
a measure of the stock's value, even if the
investor never saw that information. See id.
at 247. Thus, the fraud-on-the-market
presumption is a way to prove reliance-a
causal
link
from
the
defendant's
misrepresentation, reflected in the prevailing
market price, to each class member's
decision to buy the stock. The presumption,
however, is rebuttable-for example, by
showing that the market was already aware
of the truth behind the defendant's supposed
falsehoods and thus that those falsehoods
did not affect the market price (the so-called
"truth-on-the-market" defense), or by
showing that a particular plaintiff would
have bought the stock without relying on the
integrity of the market price. See Basic, 485
U.S. at 248-49.
The district cOUli ruled that Connecticut
Retirement successfully invoked the fraudon-the-market presumption by showing that
Amgen's stock traded in an efficient market
(which Amgen conceded) and that the
alleged misstatements were public (which
Amgen did not contest). The district court
fUliher held that at the class certification
stage, Connecticut Retirement did not need
to prove-but rather could merely allegethat Amgen's supposed falsehoods were
material to invoke the fraud-on-the-market
presumption. Materiality would, of course,
have to be proven at trial.
Moreover, the district cOUli declined to
afford Amgen an opportunity to rebut the
presumption of reliance at the class
certification stage, holding again that
rebuttal of the presumption was a trial issue.
Amgen's proposed rebuttal consisted of
evidence purportedly showing that the truth
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behind each of the supposed misstatements
had already entered the market by the time
the misstatements were made. Amgen
argued that the misstatements therefore
could not have affected Amgen's stock
price, or, by extension, anyone relying on
the integrity of that stock price.
Having found that the Rule 23(a)
prerequisites were satisfied and that
common questions predominated, the
district court certified the action as a class
action under Rule 23(b )(3).

III. Amgen's Interlocutory Appeal
We granted Amgen's Rule 23(f) request for
permission to appeal the district comi's class
certification order. See Chamberlan v. Ford
Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir.
2005). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(e).

IV. Analysis
A. Connecticut Retirement's Motion to
Vacate Grant of Permission to Appeal
At the outset, Connecticut Retirement moves
to vacate our grant of permission to appeal
the certification order, arguing that the
central issue in this appeal has been settled
by three cases decided since the district
comi certified the class: United Steel, Paper
& Forestry, R1Ibber, Man1lfact1lring Energy,
Allied Ind1lstrial & Service Workers
International Union v. ConocoPhillips Co.,
593 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2010), D1Ikes v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc), rev'd, _
U.S. _ , 131
S.Ct. 2541, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011), and
Miller v. Thane International, Inc., 615 F.3d
1095 (9th Cir. 2010). But neither United
Steel Workers nor D1Ikes was a securities
fraud case, and thus neither had occasion to
decide whether a securities fraud plaintiff

must prove materiality to avail herself of the
fraud-on-the-market
presumption
of
reliance. See United Steel, 593 F.3d at 804
(state law wage and hour claim); D1Ikes, 131
S.Ct. at 2547 (sex discrimination claim).
And Miller had no occasion to decide the
question either, because that case was
brought under a securities fraud statute
that-unlike Section 1O(b) here-does not
require the plaintiff to show reliance. See
Miller, 615 F.3d at 1102 n. 2. Accordingly,
because the question remains unsettled, we
deny Connecticut Retirement's motion.
B. Elements That Must Be Proved at the
Class Certification Stage to Invoke the
Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption of
Reliance

We review a district court's class
celiification order for abuse of discretion,
and any error of law on which a celiification
order rests is deemed a per se abuse of
discretion. See United Steel, 593 F.3d at
807; Yokoyama v. Midland Nat'! Life his.
Co., 594 F.3d 1087, 1090-91 (9th Cir.
2010).
As the party seeking class certification,
Connecticut Retirement "bears the burden of
demonstrating that the requirements of
Rules 23(a) and (b) are met." See United
Steel, 593 F.3d at 807. And the district court
facing a class certification motion is
required to conduct "a rigorous analysis" to
ensure that the Rule 23 requirements are
satisfied. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457
U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
Amgen argues that Connecticut Retirement
failed to carry that burden because it did rot
prove that Amgen's supposedly false
statements were material.
If those
misrepresentations were immaterial, Amgen
contends, they by definition would not affect
Amgen's stock price in an efficient market,
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and thus no buyer could claim to have been
misled by an artificially inflated stock price.
Thus, Amgen concludes, each individual
plaintiff would be left to prove reliance at
individually-making
a
class
trial
proceeding unwieldy.
The problem with that argument is that,
because materiality is an element of the
merits of their securities fraud claim, the
plaintiffs cannot both fail to prove
materiality yet still have a viable claim for
which they would need to prove reliance
individually. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005). If the
misrepresentations turn out to be material,
then the fraud-on-the-market presumption
makes the reliance issue common to the
class, and class treatment is appropriate. But
if the misrepresentations turn out to be
immaterial, then every plaintiffs claim fails
on the merits (materiality being a standalone
merits element), and there would be no need
for a trial on each plaintiffs individual
reliance. Either way, the plaintiffs' claims
stand or fall together - the critical question
in the Rule 23 inquiry. As the Supreme
Court said in Dukes,
"[ w]hat matters to class certification
. . . is not the raising of common
'questions'-even in droves - but,
rather the capacity of a classwide
proceeding to generate common
answers apt to drive the resolution of
the litigation. Dissimilarities within
the proposed class are what have the
potential to impede the generation of
common answers."
131 S. Ct. at 25 51 (quoting Richard A.
Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of
Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 132
(2009)).
By contrast, the elements of the fraud- on

presumption-whether
the
the-market
securities market was efficient and whether
the defendant's purpolied falsehoods were
public-are not elements of the merits of a
securities fraud claim. See D1Ira Pharm.,
544 U.S. at 341-42. Thus, if the plaintiffs
failed to prove those elements, they could
not
use
the
fraud-on-the-market
presumption, but their claims would not be
dead on arrival; they could seek to prove
reliance
individually.
That
scenario,
however, would be inappropriate for a class
proceeding. Accordingly, the district court
was correct to require Connecticut
Retirement to prove at the class certification
stage that the market for Amgen's stock was
efficient and that Amgen's supposed
misstatements were public. (Because those
elements were uncontested, we need not
decide the applicable standard of proof for
proving those elements at the class
certification stage.)
The Seventh Circuit, recently faced with this
same issue, held that proving materiality is
not a precondition to invoking the fraud-onthe-market presumption at the class
certification stage:
Defendants
say
that,
before
certifying a class, a cOUli must
determine whether false statements
materially affected the price. But
whether statements were false, or
whether the effects were large
enough to be called material, are
questions on the merits. Although we
concluded in [a prior case] that a
comi may take a peek at the merits
before celiifying a class, [we]
insisted that this peek be limited to
those aspects of the merits that affect
the decisions essential under Rule
23. If something about "the merits"
also shows that individual questions
predominate over common ones,
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then
certification
may
be
inappropriate.
Falsehood
and
materiality affect investors alike,
however. It is possible to celiify a
class under Rule 23(b)(3) even
though all statements turn out to
have only trivial effects on stock
prices. CeIiification is appropriate,
but the class wi11lose on the merits.

Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th
Cir. 2010). The Third Circuit agrees. See In
re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 631
(3d Cir. 2011) ("To invoke the fraud-on-themarket presumption of reliance, plaintiffs
must show they traded shares in an efficient
market, and the misrepresentation at Issue
became public") (citations omitted).
The three circuits that require a plaintiff to
prove materiality at the class certification
stage do so on the apparent rationale that a
footnote in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224 (1988), compels it. See id. at 248 n. 27,
108 S.Ct. 978 ("The COUli of Appeals held
that in order to invoke the presumption, a
plaintiff must allege and prove ... that the
misrepresentations were material. ... "); see
also In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia
Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 481 (2d Cir. 2008)
("The Basic Court thereby set f01ih a test of
general applicability that where a defendant
has (1) publicly made (2) a material
misrepresentation (3) about stock traded on
an
impersonal,
well-developed
(i.e.,
efficient) market, investors' reliance on
those
misrepresentations
may
be
presumed.") (citing Basic, 485 u.s. at 248 n.
27); Oscar Private Eq1lity Invs. v. Allegiance
Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 264 (5th Cir.
2007) ("The Supreme Court in Basic
adopted this presumption of reliance. . . .
Reliance is presumed if the plaintiffs can
show that '(1) the defendant made public
material misrepresentations. . . . "') (citation
omitted), abrogated on other gro1lnds by

Erica P. John Fund, 131 S.Ct. at 2183,
2186; In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig.,
432 F.3d 1, 8 n. 11 (1 st Cir. 2005) (noting in
a dictum that to invoke fraud-on-the-market
presumption at class certification stage,
plaintiff must prove materiality) (quoting
Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n. 27,108 S.Ct. 978).
But as the Seventh Circuit pointed out, those
circuits misread the Basic footnote: "All
note 27 [in Basic] does ... is state that the
cOUli of appeals deemed materiality
essential; the Justices did not adopt it as a
precondition to class certification." See
Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 687; see also Basic,
485 U.S. at 248 n. 27. That reading of Basic
also enjoys support from the Supreme
Court's more recent formulations of the
presumption in Erica P. John F1lnd and
Dukes, which require the plaintiff to show
that the stock was traded in an efficient
market but do not mention materiality as a
requirement. See Erica P. John Fund v.
Halliburton, 131 S.Ct. 2179, 2185 (2011);
Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2552 n. 6.
Moreover, two Ninth Circuit cases have
mentioned materiality as an element of the
presumption, but neither squarely held that a
plaintiff must prove materiality at the class
ceIiification stage. See Binder v. Gillespie,
184 F .3d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting
that "the presumption of reliance is available
only when a plaintiff alleges that a
defendant made material misrepresentations
or omissions concerning a security that is
actively traded in an 'efficient market,'" but
holding that presumption did not apply
because market was not efficient); Blackie v.
Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 900-01 & n. 17,
905-08 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding, in preBasic case, that complaint's allegation of
materiality sufficed to trigger presumption).
In sum, because proof of materiality is not
necessary to ensure that the question of
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reliance is common among all prospective
class members' securities fraud claims, we
hold that plaintiffs need not prove
materiality to avail themselves of the fraudon-the-market presumption of reliance at the
class certification stage. They need only
allege materiality with sufficient plausibility
to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion. See Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
C. Opportunity to Rebut the Presumption
at the Class Certification Stage

Amgen also argues that the district court
erred by not affording it an opportunity to
rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption
at the class certification stage. Specifically,
Amgen sought to introduce evidence that
FDA announcements and analyst reports
about Amgen's business publicized the truth
about the safety issues looming over
Amgen's drugs, and thus that Amgen's
alleged misrepresentations could not have
affected the stock price-the so-called
"truth-on-the-market" defense. See, e.g.,
Basic, 485 U.S. at 248-49 ("[I]f, despite
[defendants'] allegedly fraudulent attempt to
manipulate market price, [the truth] credibly
entered the market and dissipated the effects

of the misstatements, those who traded . . .
after the corrective statements would have
no direct or indirect connection with the
fraud.").
But as the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit
have explained, the truth-on-the-market
defense is a method of refuting an alleged
misrepresentation's materiality. See, e.g.,
Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S.
1083, 1097-98 (1991); Provenz v. Miller,
102 F.3d 1478, 1492 (9th Cir. 1996). As
explained above, a plaintiff need not prove
materiality at the class certification stage to
invoke the presumption; materiality is a
merits issue to be reached at trial or by
summary judgment motion if the facts are
uncontested. The only elements a plaintiff
must prove at the class certification stage are
whether the market for the stock was
efficient
and
whether
the
alleged
misrepresentations were public-issues that
Amgen does not contest here.
Thus, the district court correctly refused to
consider
Amgen's
truth-on-the-market
defense at the class certification stage.
AFFIRMED.
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"High Court to Hear Amgen Challenge"
The Wall Street Journal
June 11,2012
Brett Kendall
The U.S. Supreme COUli said Monday it will
consider Amgen lnc.'s challenge to a
securities lawsuit alleging the biotech
company played down safety concerns about
two drugs used to treat anemia.
The suit, brought by Connecticut pension
funds on behalf of purchasers of Amgen
stock, alleged the Thousand Oaks, Calif.,
company repeatedly reassured investors
about the safety of anti-anemia drugs
Aranesp and Epogen even as clinical trial
data raised concerns that the drugs could
harm cancer patients who were taking them.
Amgen's statements led to inflated share
prices, the suit alleged.
The lawsuit alleged the misrepresentations
took place from April 2004 through May 10,
2007, a day when Amgen's shares dropped
more than 9% after a Food and Drug
Administration panel expressed concerns
about the drugs and recommended new
limits on patient use.
Amgen is seeking to oveliurn a lower-court
ruling that certified the lawsuit to proceed as

a class action. The company said the
plaintiffs couldn't show that the alleged
misrepresentations had a material effect on
the price of Amgen shares. The market had
readily available access to the safety
information that Amgen allegedly played
down, the company said.
At issue before the Supreme Court is
whether securities plaintiffs, before being
allowed to proceed with a class-action
lawsuit, have to demonstrate that a
company's
alleged
misrepresentations
materially affected share prices.
Amgen argued that companies need to be
able to defeat weak lawsuits at early stages
of the proceedings. Otherwise, companies
will feel financial pressures to settle cases
even when they think they have a strong
defense, Amgen said.
The case is Amgen v. Connecticut
Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 111085. The Supreme Court is expected to
hear oral arguments in the fall.
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"Amgen May Face Trial for Allegedly Fudging Info"
Courthouse NeHls Service
November 8, 2011
Tim Hull

Stockholders can move ahead with a class
action alleging that the biotechnology
company Amgen inflated its stock price by
misstating
and
withholding
safety
information about its anemia drugs, the 9th
Circuit ruled Tuesday.
While Amgen promoted its products, the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration had
concerns, according to the consolidated
securities-fraud action filed by Connecticut
Retirement Plans and Trust Funds and other
investors. Amgen allegedly hid the true
nature of these concerns and "concealed
details about a clinical trial that was
canceled over concerns that Amgen's
product exacerbated tumor growth in a small
number of patients," according to the court's
description of the case.
Investors
also
claim
that
Amgen
misrepresented the on-label safety of the
drugs and "promoted significant off-label
usage, in violation of federal drug branding
statutes. "
The investors moved for federal class status
in Los Angeles, arguing that Amgen's
alleged misstatements and omissions had
inflated the company's stock price and cost
them money.
U.S. District Judge Philip Gutierrez found
the allegations sufficient, and the plaintiffs
sufficiently linked, to certify the class.
Specifically, he found that the plaintiffs had

reliance in common based on the "fraud-onthe-market" presumption: "the principle that
the market price of a security traded in an
efficient market reflects all public
information and therefore that a buyer of the
security is presumed to have relied on the
truthfulness of that information In
purchasing the security," according to the
ruling.
The 9th Circuit agreed in an interlocutory
appeal, affirming the lower comi and
rejecting Amgen's call for proof of
materiality rather than mere plausible
allegations among the class.
"Plaintiffs need not prove materiality to
avail themselves of the fraud-on-the-market
presumption of reliance at the class
certification stage," Judge Barry Silverman
wrote for the unanimous, three-judge panel
in Pasadena. "They need only allege
materiality with sufficient plausibility."
Silverman added that the proposed class had
"plausibly alleged that several of the
defendants'
public
statements
about
Amgen's pharmaceutical products were
false and material."
"Coupled with the concession that Amgen's
stock traded in an efficient market," he
wrote, "this was sufficient to invoke the
of
fraud-on-the-market
presumption
reliance. "
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"Amgen Gets Supreme Court Review
of Stock Fraud Lawsuit"
Bloomberg
June 11,2012
Bob Drummond

The U.S. Supreme COUli will decide
whether investors
must prove that
misinformation from Amgen (AMGN) Inc.
propped up its stock price before they can
pursue a class-action stock-fraud suit against
the world's largest biotechnology company.
The justices today agreed to review an
appeal by Amgen in a case alleging the
company and its executives misled investors
for more than three years about safety
questions involving its Aranesp and Epogen
anemia drugs.
Amgen says a federal appeals court ruling
makes it too easy to mount class-action
lawsuits representing thousands of people,
pressuring companies to pay settlements for
even frivolous allegations rather than risk
huge damages in a trial. Amgen's appeal is
backed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
and the pharmaceutical industry's trade
group.
"Securities class actions are almost always
settled once a class is certified, because the
risks to a defendant of going to trial are so
substantial," a group of law professors and
former
Securities
and
Exchange
Commission members said III a brief
suppOliing Amgen's bid for a Supreme
COUli hearing.
All sides agree that the investors alleging
securities fraud must, at some point, show
that misrepresentations by Amgen had an
effect on its share price.
The company says judges should resolve

disputes about the relevance of misleading
information before letting multiple investors
band together in a class-action suit. The San
Francisco-based 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals disagreed, saying that, if a case
meets other requirements for class-action
status, evidence about the effect on share
price must wait for the trial itself.

'Enormous Sums'
Because the potential cost of class-action
lawsuits is so large, Amgen said companies
will "frequently be forced, by practical
realities, to settle cases for enormous sums"
before trial. They may never get a chance to
prove that allegedly misleading statements
were irrelevant, the Thousand Oaks,
California-based company said.
The 9th Circuit's ruling acknowledged that
other federal appeals courts have conflicting
VieWS.

A New York-based federal cOUli has said
investors must show that misleading
information affected stock prices before a
judge can allow a class-action suit. An
appeals cOUli in Philadelphia doesn't require
investors to show the effect on share price at
that point, although it has said a company
can defeat a request for class-action status
by proving that alleged wrongdoing had no
impact on trading.

Class-Action Rules
In a case last year about the standards for
granting class- action status, the Supreme
295

Court
sided
with
investors,
lUling
unanimously that they could sue Halliburton
Co. (HAL) as a group without first showing
that they lost money because of alleged
fraud.
Investors, led by Connecticut's public
employee pension plans, allege that Amgen
executives withheld or played down safety
concerns, including questions about whether
its anemia drugs contributed to growth of
cancerous tumors. Amgen says it didn't

mislead investors, and that information
about drug-safety questions was widely
known and was reflected in Amgen's share
pnce.
The justices will hear arguments in the case
during the term that begins in October.
The case is Amgen v. Connecticut
Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 111085.
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"Solving a Circuit Splitter: Amgen
in the High Court"
The National Law Review
July 3, 2012
Robert A. Horowitz
Must a plaintiff in a securities fraud class
action
prove
that
the
alleged
misrepresentations or omissions are material
in order to obtain class celiification? That is
the issue the US. Supreme Court agreed to
consider when it granted certiorari in

Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust
Funds v. Amgen, 660 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir.
2011), celio granted, _
2012).

US. _ , (June 11,

In Amgen, the Ninth Circuit held that
materiality is not an issue at the class
certification stage-a plaintiff can rely on
the fraud-on-the-market presumption to
demonstrate that reliance is a common issue
simply by proving that there is an efficient
market for the security at issue and the
misrepresentation was pUblic. The court
observed that materiality is a merits issue to
be addressed in a motion for summary
judgment or at trial, not at the class
certification stage. Amgen, 660 F.3d at 1177.
In light of this holding, the cOUli also
rejected Amgen's argument that it should be
permitted an opportunity to rebut the fraudon-the-market presumption to defeat class
certification by pointing to evidence that the
tmth already was published to the market so
the alleged misrepresentations could not
have affected the stock price because this so
called "tmth-on-the-market" defense is a
of
refuting
an
alleged
method
misrepresentation's materiality. Id.
With this holding, the Ninth Circuit joined
the Seventh Circuit (Schleicher V. Wendt,
618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010)) and the

Third Circuit (In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Lit., 639
F.3d 623,631 (3d Cir. 2011)). Three circuits
disagree: the Second Circuit (1n re
SalomonAnalyst Metromedia Litig., 544
F.3d 474, 481 (2d Cir. 2008)), the Fifth
Circuit (OscarPrivate Equity Invs. V.
Allegiance Telecom Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 264
(5th Cir. 2007)), and the First Circuit (1n re
PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 8
n. 11 (1 st Cir. 2005).
The Ninth Circuit noted that its conclusion
(and that of the Seventh Circuit) "enjoys
suppOli from the Supreme Court's more
recent formulations of the presumption in
Erica P. John Fund and Dukes, which
require the plaintiff to show that the stock
was traded in an efficient market but do not
mention materiality as a requirement."
Amgen at 1176.
However, Erica P. John Fund Inc. V.
Halliburton, 563 U.S. _ , 131 S. Ct. 1179
(2011), does not support the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion and, in fact, suggests a contrary
conclusion. In Halliburton, the Supreme
Court held that a plaintiff need not prove
loss causation to obtain class certification in
a securities fraud class action. It noted that
reliance is a common element if the plaintiff
can rely on the fraud-on-the-market
presumption and the presumption does not
require a showing of loss causation. "Loss
causation addresses a matter different from
whether an
investor relied on a
misrepresentation
presumptively
or
otherwise, when buying or selling a stock."
Id. at2186.
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However, the court reiterated that the fraudon-the-market theory applies only with
regard to "material misrepresentations."
Quoting from its opinion in Basic v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, the Supreme COUli
stated in Hal1iburton: "According to [the
fraud-on-the-market theory], 'the market
price of shares reflects all publicly available
information, and, hence, any material
misrepresentations." Id. at 2185.
The court described as "Basic's fundamental
premise" "that an investor presumptively
relies on a misrepresentation so long as it
was reflected in the market price at the time
of his transaction." Id. at 2186. As Basic
made clear, the market price reflects all
material representations. Thus, for the fraudon-the-market presumption to apply, a
plaintiff should be required to prove that the
alleged misrepresentation is material.
In Halliburton, the defendant argued that
while the Fifth Circuit in Amgen held that
plaintiff was required to prove loss causation
to obtain class celiification, what the Fifth
Circuit really meant was that plaintiff was
required to prove that the alleged
misrepresentation affected the market price,
i.e., that the misrepresentation was material.
The Supreme Court elected not to address
the issue: "While the opinion below may
include some language consistent with a
'price impact' approach . . . , we simply
cannot ignore the COUli of Appeals'
repeated and explicit references to 'loss
causation,' [citations omitted]. Whatever
Halliburton thinks the Court of Appeals
meant to say, what it said was loss
causation .... We take the Court of Appeals
at its word. Based on those words, the
decision cannot stand." Id. at 2187.
Thus,

while

the

Supreme

Court

ill

Halliburton agreed with the Second Circuit's
holding in Salomon Analyst Metromedia
that the plaintiff is not required to prove loss
causation at the class certification stage, it
did not address the Second Circuit's holding
that the plaintiff has the burden to establish
that the alleged misrepresentations were
material in order to invoke the fraud-on-themarket presumption.
In Salomon Analyst Metromedia, the Second
Circuit held that the plaintiff seeking class
certification could satisfy its burden to prove
materiality without showing a market price
reaction by demonstrating under the test first
enunciated in TSC Ind1ls. Inc. v. Northway
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), "a
substantial likelihood that the alleged
misrepresentations and omissions would
have been viewed by a reasonable investor
as having significantly altered the 'total mix'
of information available."
The Second Circuit held this was sufficient
to make a threshold showing that the
misrepresentations were material, but that
defendants would have to be afforded an
opportunity before class certification to
demonstrate that the misrepresentations
were not material, which the defendants
could do by showing that "the allegedly
false or misleading material statements did
not measurably impact the market price of
the security." Id. at 486 n.9.
In Oscar v. Allegiance, 487 F.3d 262, 264
(5th Cir. 2007), the Fifth Circuit went
fUliher, holding that plaintiff has the burden
to prove that the alleged misrepresentation
"actually moved the market." However, the
Oscar cOUli's holding was based on its
requirement that the plaintiff must prove
loss causation to invoke the fraud-on-themarket presumption. Id. at 265. As
discussed above, that rationale was
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undermined by the Supreme Court's
rejection of the loss causation requirement in
Halliburton.
Conclusion
The
fraud-on-the-market
presumption
applies where the defendant publicly makes
a material misrepresentation about a stock
traded in an efficient market. Therefore, to
take advantage of the fraud-on-the-market
presumption to obtain class certification, a
plaintiff should be required to prove that the

alleged misrepresentation is material.
Moreover, although not required to prove
loss causation, a plaintiff should be required
to show that the alleged misrepresentation
actually impacted the stock price. Requiring
a plaintiff to demonstrate an impact on the
stock price would provide a much needed
bright line test as to whether the alleged
misrepresentation is in fact material, and
therefore whether the case should proceed as
a class action.
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Nike, Inc. v. Already, LLC
11-982
Ruling Below: Nike, Inc. v. Already, LLC, 663 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 2012 WL
425184 (U.S. 2012).
In July 2009, Nike, the producer of Air Force 1 sneakers, sued Already, the producer of YUMS
shoes, alleging trademark infringement, false designation of origin, unfair competition, and
trademark dilution. Already denied infringement and filed a counterclaim challenging validity of
Nike's mark registration. In March 2010, Nike delivered a "Covenant Not to Sue" (the
"Covenant") to Already and moved to dismiss its complaint with prejudice and then dismiss
Already's counterclaim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York proceeded to dismiss Nike's claim with prejudice and dismiss
Already's counterclaims without prejudice, finding that the court no longer had jurisdiction over
the counterclaim. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order,
finding that after Nike's Covenant Not to Sue, there was no longer a live controversy upon which
the court could find jurisdiction.
Question Presented: Whether a federal district court is divested of Article III jurisdiction over
a party's challenge to the validity of a federally registered trademark if the registrant promises
not to assert its mark against the party's then-existing commercial activities.

NIKE, INC., Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee,

v.
ALREADY, LLC d/b/a Yums, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Decided December 10,2011
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
LOHIER, Circuit Judge
This appeal requires us to decide whether a
trademark registrant's delivery of a covenant
not to sue, and voluntmy dismissal of its
trademark claims, divests a federal court of
subject
matter jurisdiction
over
a
defendant's counterclaims for a declaratory
of the
judgment
and
cancellation
trademark's registration. After considering
the breadth of the plaintiffs covenant not to
sue and the improbability of future

infringement, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York
(Richard J. Sullivan, 1.) dismissed the
defendant's counterclaims because no case
or controversy existed under Article III of
the United States Constitution. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
1. The Complaint and Counterclaims

In July 2009, plaintiff Nike, Inc. filed a
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complaint against defendant Already, LLC
d/b/a Yums ("Yums"), alleging trademark
infringement, false designation of origin,
unfair competition, and trademark dilution
in
violation
of
15
U.S.C.
§§
1114(1), 1125(a), and 1125(c), and related
claims under New York common law and
New Yode General Business Law § 360.
According to the complaint, in 1982, Nike
designed a shoe called the Air Force 1,
which it has since produced in more than
1,700 color combinations, selling millions of
pairs each year. The complaint alleged that
the Air Force 1 shoe has a distinctive
appearance for which Nike owns several
federal trademark registrations, including
U.S. Trademark Registration Number
3,451,905, registered with the United States
Patent and Trademark Office on June 24,
2008 (hereinafter the "'905 Registration"),
for "the design of the stitching on the
exterior of the shoe, the design of the
material panels that form the exterior body
of the shoe, the design of the wavy panel on
the top of the shoe that encompasses the
eyelets for the shoe laces, the design of the
vertical ridge pattern on the sides of the sole
of the shoe, and the relative position of these
elements to each other." Compl. ~ 11
(quoting the '905 Registration). It further
alleged that Yums was selling "footwear
bearing a confusingly similar imitation" of
the Air Force 1 shoe, including shoes known
as Sugar and Soulja Boy.ld. at ~~ 14-15.
In November 2009, Yums filed counterclaims for a declaratory judgment that the
'905 Registration was not in fact a
"trademark" under 15 U.S.C. § 1127 or New
York law, and for cancellation of the '905
Registration pursuant to the cancellation
provisions of the Lanham Act,15 U.S.C. §
1119. Yums also alleged that an "actual
controversy" existed regarding whether
Yums had infringed any rights Nike had in
the purported trademark.

2. The Covenant Not To Sue
In March 2010, Nike delivered a "Covenant
Not to Sue" (the "Covenant") to Yums. The
Covenant's preamble stated as follows:
NIKE has recently learned that
[Yums]'s actions complained of in
the Complaint no longer infringe or
dilute the NIKE Mark at a level
sufficient to warrant the substantial
time and expense of continued
litigation and NIKE wishes to
conserve resources relating to its
enforcement of the NIKE Mark.
The Covenant obligated Nike as follows:
to refrain from making any claim(s)
or demand(s), or from commencing,
causing, or permitting to be
prosecuted any action in law or
equity, against [Yums] or any of its
[successors or related entities and
their customers], on account of any
possible cause of action based on or
involving trademark infringement,
unfair competition, or dilution, under
state or federal law in the United
Sates [sic] relating to the NIKE Mark
based on the appearance of any of
[Yums]'s current and/or previous
footwear product designs, and any
colorable
imitations
thereof,
regardless of whether that foot-wear
is produced, distributed, offered for
sale, adveliised, sold, or otherwise
used in commerce before or after the
Effective Date of this Covenant.

3. The District Court Proceedings and
Decision
In April 2010, a month after Nike delivered
the Covenant, the District COUli held a
hearing to determine whether the Covenant
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divested it of subject matter jurisdiction over
Yums's counterclaims. Although Nike
conceded during the hearing that it would be
bound by the Covenant even if Yums
became a competitive threat, Yums argued
that a case or controversy persisted because
Nike's litigation-and the '905 Registration
itself-constituted a "continuing libel"
against Yums by making it appear that
Yums had infringed and continued to
infringe Nike's trademark. In the course of
its argument, Yums acknowledged that it
had not previously sought to cancel the '905
Registration, which had been filed nearly
two years earlier.
After the hearing, Nike moved pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(l) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to dismiss Yums's counter-claims
without prejudice on the ground that the
District Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. Nike also moved to dismiss its
own claims voluntarily and with prejudice,
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2).
In response, Yums argued that Nike's claims
should be dismissed with prejudice by
summary judgment under Rule 56(b) rather
than Rule 41 (a)(2) to allow the action,
insofar as it included Yums's counterclaims, to proceed. Yums argued that its
counterclaims were not subject to dismissal
along with Nike's claims because, under the
Declaratory Judgment Act, they created an
independent controversy over whether Nike
had violated Yums's rights by improperly
obtaining a trademark registration.
To demonstrate the existence of an actual
controversy notwithstanding the Covenant's
broad language, Yums filed affidavits from
prospective investors who suggested that
Nike's lawsuit had deterred them from
investing in Yums or had prompted them to
withdraw prior investments. A former
investor in Yums, for example, stated that he

resold his stock to Yums at a loss after
learning of Nike's lawsuit, which he feared
would tarnish Yums's reputation and deter
other investors from investing in the
company. The investor explained that the
Covenant provided inadequate assurance
that Nike could not "assert its trademarks
against" Yums in the future over the sales of
shoes similar to Air Force 1.
On January 20, 2011, the District Court
dismissed Nike's claims with prejudice and
Yums's counterclaims without prejudice.
See Nike, Inc. v. Already, LLC, d/b/a Yums,
No.09 Civ. 6366(RJS), 2011 WL 310321, at
*1, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2011). In
dismissing Nike's claims "on consent," the
District Court explained that Yums had
"consent[ ed] to" dismissal of these claims
but did not specify which rule, if any, it was
invoking.Id. at *2.
Turning to Yums's counterclaims and
relying on Medlmmllne, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007), the District Court
first concluded that Yums's declaratory
judgment action failed to create a justiciable
"case or controversy," since a declaratory
judgment claimant "must, 'under all the
circumstances,' demonstrate 'a substantial
controversy, between parties having adverse
legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and
reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment.'" Nike, Inc., 2011 WL
310321, at *4 (quoting Medlmmllne, 549
U.S. at 127). The District Court held that
Yums's counterclaims did not meet this
standard in light of the Covenant. In
reaching this conclusion, the District Court
considered the Covenant's language and
broad scope, id., Yums's failure to show that
it had taken meaningful steps to create new
shoes not covered by the Covenant, id.
(quoting Diamonds.net LLC v. IdexOnline,
Ltd., 590 F.Supp.2d 593, 600 (S.D.N.Y.
2008)), and the absence of prior litigation
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between Nike and Yums. Id. at *5 (citing
ICaS Vision Sys. CO/p., N. V v. Scanner
Techs. CO/p., 699 F.Supp.2d 664, 670-71
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Chin, J.)). The District
Court then ruled that Yums's counterclaim
for cancellation of the '905 Registration
under 15 U.S.c. § 1119 failed to confer
subject matter jurisdiction because such a
claim can arise only as part of a separate,
independently supportable action. Id. at *67. Lastly, without holding an evidentiary
hearing, the District Court rejected Yums's
application for attorneys' fees under the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), because
the case was not "exceptional" as required
by the Act.Id. at *8.
Yums timely appealed, challenging both the
District Court's dismissal of its claims and
the court's denial of Yums's motion for
attorneys' fees without an evidentiary
hearing.
DISCUSSION

We determine the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction before addressing other
threshold issues. Where a district court
dismisses an action "for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, we review factual
findings for clear error and legal conclusions
de novo. " Maloney v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 517
F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2008). A "case is
properly dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)( 1) when the
district court lacks the statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate it."
Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110,
113 (2d Cir. 2000).
1. Rule 41(a)(2)

Because the District Court's conclusion that
it lacked jurisdiction followed its dismissal
ofNike's claims under Rule 41 (a)(2), Yums
urges us to review in the first instance

whether the District Court complied with
that rule, which provides, in relevant part:
Except as provided in Rule 41(a)(l),
an action may be dismissed at the
plaintiffs request only by court order,
on terms that the court considers
proper. If a defendant has pleaded a
counterclaim before being served
with the plaintiffs motion to dismiss,
the action may be dismissed over the
defendant's objection only if the
counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2). Yums claims that it
did not consent to dismissal of its counterclaims, and that the District Court's
dismissal of the entire action in fact
occurred "over the defendant's objection" in
violation of the second sentence of the rule.
When a plaintiff seeks to withdraw its
claims pursuant to Rule 41 (a)(2), but
another event independently deprives the
district court of an Article III case or
controversy involving the defendant's
counterclaims, Rule 41 (a)(2) is irrelevant.
See Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase
Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1057 n. 2
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding it unnecessary to
consider whether dismissal pursuant to Rule
41 (a)(2) was proper where dismissal was
clearly proper because of the absence of an
Article III case or controversy), abrogated
on other grounds by Medlmmune, 549 U.S.
118; see also Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v.
TCI Cablevision of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d
1333, 1340 & n. 6 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(affirming a dismissal of a counterclaim
based on a lack of Article III case or
controversy even though the district court
had not indicated any reliance on Rule
41(a)(2) or a statement of non-liability, and
the record failed to show whether the
defendant consented to Rule 41 (a)(2) relief).
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Accordingly, we need not further address
Rule 41 (a)(2) because we conclude, as a
matter of law, that Nike's delivery of the
Covenant to Yums divested the District
Court of subject matter jurisdiction, and we
affirm on that basis.

2. The Covenant Not To Sue
In order to qualify as a justiciable "case or
controversy" under Article III, "[t]he
controversy must be definite and concrete,
touching the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests." Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937).
The "case or controversy" requirement is not
satisfied by a "difference or dispute of a
hypothetical or abstract character." Id. at
240. In trade-mark cases seeking relief
under either the Declaratory Judgment Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), or Section 37 of the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1119, a valid
covenant not to sue may strip district courts
of jurisdiction. We review the jurisdictional
effect of such a covenant under both Acts in
turn.

a. Declaratory Judgment Act
We turn first to the effect of such a covenant
in trademark cases involving the Declaratory
Judgment Act, which provides in relevant
part:
In a case of actual controversy within
its jurisdiction . . . any court of the
United States, upon the filing of an
appropriate pleading, may declare
the rights and other legal relations of
any interested party seeking such
declaration, whether or not fuliher
relief is or could be sought.
28 U.S.c. § 2201(a). The Declaratory
Judgment Act does not expand the subject
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. See

PDK Labs, Inc. v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d
1105, 1110 (2d Cir. 1997). In Aetna, the
Supreme Court "explained that the phrase
'case of actual controversy' in the Act refers
to the type of 'Cases' and 'Controversies'
that are justiciable under Article III."
Medlmmllne, 549 U.S. at 127 (citing Aetna,
300 U.S. at 240). Its pronouncement in
Aetna was refined four years later in
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal& Gil
Co., 312 U.S. 270,273 (1941), in which the
Supreme Court endorsed a totality of the
circumstances test for determining whether a
party seeking relief under the Act has
demonstrated
that
a
justiciable
"controversy" exists. The Court in Maryland
Casualty explained that "[b ]asically, the
question in each case is whether the facts
alleged, under all the circumstances, show
that there is a substantial controversy,
between pmiies having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality
to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
judgment." Id. In adopting this test, the
Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he
difference between an abstract question and
a 'controversy' contemplated by the
Declaratory Judgment Act is necessarily one
of degree, and it would be difficult, if it
would be possible, to fashion a precise test
for determining in every case whether there
is such a controversy." Id.
We did not apply the Maryland Casualty
test in a trademark case until Starter Corp. v.
Converse, Inc., 84 F.3d 592, 595 (2d Cir.
1996) (per curiam). In that case, we
employed
a
two-pronged
test
for
determining
whether
subject
matter
jurisdiction exists:
[i]n a declaratory judgment action
involving trademarks, the test for an
"actual case or controversy" has two
prongs, both of which must be
satisfied 111 order to establish
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declaratory judgment jurisdiction:
(1) has the defendant's conduct
created a real and reasonable
apprehension of liability on the part
of the plaintiff, and (2) has the
plaintiff engaged in a course of
conduct which has brought it into
adversarial
conflict
with
the
defendant.

ld. at 595.
After our decision in Starter, the Supreme
Medlmmllne,
which
Court
decided
confirmed that Malyland Casllalty 's totality
of the circumstances test for declaratory
judgment actions applied in intellectual
property cases, see 549 U.S. at 126-27, but
Starter's
reasonable
which
rejected
apprehension requirement, id. at 122, 132
(quoting Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359
F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
Medlmmllne requires that we consider only
whether the adversity of legal interests that
exists between the parties is '''real and
substantial'" and "'admi[ts] of specific relief
through a decree of a conclusive character,
as distinguished from an opinion advising
what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts.'" ld. at 127 (quoting Aetna
Lifelns., Co., 300 U.S. at 241). The Court
also suggested that the threat of future
litigation remains relevant in determining
whether an actual controversy exists. As in
Medlmmllne, for example, simply holding
litigation in abeyance, where a party could
forestall litigation indefinitely by paying
licensing fees, does not eliminate the case or
controversy. ld. at 128 ("[The declaratory
judgment plaintiffJ's own acts ... eliminate
the imminent threat of harm [and][t]he
question before us is whether this causes the
dispute no longer to be a case or controversy
within the meaning of Article III.").
Until now, we have not applied Medlmmllne

in an intellectual property case. However, a
few of our sister circuits have done so in the
context of declaratory judgment actions
involving patents, which we have described
as sufficiently "analogous" to those
involving trademarks that "principles
applicable to declaratory judgment actions
involving patents are generally applicable
with respect to trademarks." Starter Corp.,
84 F.3d at 596; see also Revollltion
Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., 556
F.3d 1294, 1298-99 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(applying Medlmmllne to declaratory
judgment action involving patents).
In determining whether a covenant not to
sue eliminates a justiciable case or
controversy in a declaratory judgment action
involving a trademark, district courts
applying the Medlmmllne totality of the
circumstances
test
should
especially
consider, in addition to other factors: (1) the
language of the covenant, (2) whether the
covenant covers future, as well as past,
activity and products, and (3) evidence of
intention or lack of intention, on the part of
the party asserting jurisdiction, to engage in
new activity or to develop new potentially
infringing products that arguably are not
covered by the covenant.
Applying these factors here, we agree with
the District Comi that it had no actual case
or controversy before it. The language of the
Covenant is broad, covering both present
and future products: Nike "unconditionally"
and permanently renounced its right to
claim, demand or "commenc[e], caus[e] or
permit[] to be prosecuted any action in law
or in equity" with respect to any shoe
currently made by Yums, including the
Sugar and Soulja Boy shoes, and all
colorable imitations thereof. Nike, Inc., 2011
WL 310321, at *1-2. The breadth of the
Covenant renders the threat of litigation
remote or non-existent even if Yums
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continues to market and sell these shoes or
significantly increases their production.
Given the similarity of Yums's designs to
the '905 mark and the breadth of the
Covenant, it is hard to imagine a scenario
that would potentially infringe the '905
mark and yet not fall under the Covenant.
Yums has not asserted any intention to
market any such shoe. Nike, Inc., 2011 WL
310321, at *4.
In Revolution Eyewear, 556 F.3d at 1296,
the Federal Circuit concluded that a
controversy persisted when the plaintiff
delivered a covenant that promised not to
sue only as to prior sales of the allegedly
infringing product. The crucial difference
between Revolution Eyel,,/ear and this case is
the scope of the two covenants. In
Revolution Eyewear, it was undisputed that
the covenant did not protect the defendant
from suit for any future marketing. Id. Here,
the Covenant is far broader. It covers both
past sales and future sales of both existing
products and colorable imitations. Given the
breadth of the Covenant, no controversy
exists.
Yums nevertheless urges that a justiciable
controversy
persists
because
Nike's
litigation continues to have an injurious
effect. Pointing to the affidavits of various
investors, Yums alleges harm from the
potential loss of investments by investors
who fear infringement lawsuits in the future
and for that reason have refrained from
further investing or have withdrawn their
investments. In this case, potential investor
concerns about infringement law-suits
against the company, despite Nike's broad
Covenant, fail to establish the sort of
genuinely adverse legal interests between
Nike and Yums that Medlmmune requires.
In addition, Yums contends that the
Covenant is a "continuing libel" against it
because the Covenant asserts Yums' s

ongoing de minimis infringement of Nike's
trademark. Yums did not file a counterclaim
alleging libel, however, and in any event we
reject the contention that the mere existence
of a document asserting infringementwhere the registrant cannot assert a claim
relating to that infringement-creates a case
or controversy.
Relying on Cardinal Chemical Co. v.
Morton International, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 96,
99-103 (1993), Yums also argues that a
finding of non-infringement does not
deprive a court of jurisdiction to rule on the
validity of a trademark or patent. Cardinal
Chemical is inapposite, however, as it
"concern[s]
the jurisdiction
of an
intermediate appellate court, not a trial
court." Giese v. Pierce Chern. Co., 43
F.Supp.2d 98, 112 n. 14 (D.Mass. 1999); see
also Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods,
Ltd., 78 F.3d 540, 546 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
("The Supreme Court's decision in Cardinal
Chemical is limited to the specific facts of
that case[;] [s ]pecifically, [that] an
affirmance by th[ e] court [of appeals] of a
finding of noninfringement is not, by itself,
enough to vacate a declaratory judgment
holding the patent invalid."). Moreover,
unlike the trial court in Cardinal Chemical,
the District Court here made no "finding[ s]"
on the merits of Yums's declaratory
judgment action. See Cardinal Chemical,
508 U.S. at 86, 95 (emphasizing that the
only issue before the Court was the circuit
court's jurisdiction, and that "[i]n the trial
court, of course, a party seeking a
declaratory judgment has the burden of
establishing the existence of an actual case
or controversy").
Yums also makes much of the District
Court's exercise of subject matter
jurisdiction over Nike's claims, which Yums
contends was inconsistent with the District
Court's determination that a case or
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controversy no longer existed. We have
already acknowledged that the District Court
could have dismissed Nike's claims either
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or "on
consent." See supra at 92-94. But Yums has
not appealed the District COUlt's exercise of
jurisdiction over Nike's claims, which
resulted in a lUling favorable to Yums, and
in the part of the District COUlt order that is
before us there is no error.
b. The Lanham Act

We turn next to the Lanham Act, IS U.S.c.
§ 1119, which Yums contends provides an
independent basis of federal subject matter
jurisdiction, notwithstanding the dismissal
of the underlying trademark claim. Under
the Lanham Act, district courts are
authorized to cancel registrations, but only
"[i]n any action involving a registered
mark." 15 U.S.c. § 1119. The limiting
phrase "[i]n any action involving a
registered mark" plainly narrows the
circumstances in which cancellation may be
sought-namely, in connection with "a
properly
instituted
and
otherwise
jurisdictionally supportable action involving
a registered mark." Universal Sewing Mach.
Co. v. Standard Sewing Equip. Corp., 185
F.Supp. 257,260 (S.D.N.V. 1960).
Section 1119 therefore creates a remedy for
trademark infringement rather than an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction.
Both the Third Circuit and the Federal
Circuit have held that, by its plain terms, this
provision requires that "a controversy as to
the validity of or interference with a
registered mark . . . exist before a district
COUlt has jurisdiction to grant the
cancellation remedy." Ditri v. Coldwell
Banker Residential Affiliates, Inc., 954 F.2d
869, 873 (3d Cir. 1992); see id. (noting that
a petition to the Patent and Trademark
Office is the "primary means of securing a

cancellation," and that § 1119 provides no
independent basis for jurisdiction) (citing
Universal Sewing Mack Co., 185 F.Supp. at
260); Windsurfing Int'! Inc. v. AMF Inc.,
828 F.2d 755, 758-59 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see
also McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition § 30: 11 0 (4th ed. 2010)
("[Section 1119] alone does not create
grounds for federal jurisdiction."). We agree
with their analysis, and hold that a claim for
trademark cancellation under § 1119 is
insufficient to support federal jurisdiction
where a covenant not to sue has resolved the
underlying infringement action.
Yums cites only one case, Bancroft &
Masters, Inc. v. Aug1lsta National Inc., 223
F .3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000), in support of its
argument that a COUlt may retain jurisdiction
over a § 1119 claim notwithstanding the end
of a case or controversy with respect to the
rest of the action. The Ninth Circuit in
Bancroft & Masters, however, concluded
that the promise not to sue in that case failed
to end the case or controversy. ld. at 1085.
Its pronouncement that even an unqualified
promise "would not have mooted [the]
separate request for [§ 1119] cancellation of
[the] trademarks" is therefore dictum. Id. Tn
addition, the Ninth Circuit in Bancroft failed
to consider the language in § 1119 that
renders
that
section remedial,
not
jurisdictional. Accordingly, we find its
opmlOn unpersuasive.
Yums next characterizes Nike's original
lawsuit as a "properly instituted and
otherwise
jurisdictionally
supportable
action" and contends that this fact alone
provided a basis for the District Court to
retain jurisdiction over Yums's § 1119
cancellation counterclaim notwithstanding
the Covenant. Yums's argument ignores the
settled lUle that the "case-or-controversy
requirement . . . subsists through all stages
of federal judicial proceedings." White River
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Am1lsement P1Ib, Inc. v. Town of Hartford,
481 F.3d 163, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Spencer v.
Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)). Although
Nike's action was "properly instituted," it
was no longer 'jurisdictionally supportable"
after the Covenant was delivered.

3. Attorneys' Fees
We review an order denying attorneys' fees
under the Lanham Act for abuse of
discretion. See Gordon & Breach Science
P1Iblishers S.A. v. Am. Inst, of Physics, 166
F.3d 438, 439 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
Such fees are available only in "exceptional
cases," which generally means that fees will
be awarded to the defendant only if the
plaintiff filed the action in bad faith. See

Banff, Ltd. v. Colberts, Inc., 996 F.2d 33, 36
(2d Cir. 1993). Here, Nike filed its action
pursuant to its own registered trademark and
withdrew the action quickly. On the record
before us, we cannot say that the District
Court abused its discretion when it found
that Nike had not acted in bad faith, and
Yums fails to identify what additional
information the District Comt needed to
make an informed decision about attorneys'
fees. Accordingly, we find no abuse of
discretion in its decision to deny fees
without a hearing.

CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
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"Supreme Court Forces Nike to Defend its Right
Not to Defend its Trademarks"
Re1lters
June 27, 2012
Alison Frankel

Is a trademark owner's promise not to sue
for infringement a good enough reason for a
challenger to the mark to be forced to walk
away from litigation? On Monday the U.S.
Supreme Court gave intellectual property
practitioners a good reason to look forward
to next term, granting celiiorari to a shoe
company called Already in a trademark
dispute with Nike. The case has a throughthe-looking-glass quality because the issue
is whether Already can proceed with
counterclaims against Nike even though
Nike dropped its infringement case against
Already.
Here's the backstory. In 2009 Nike sued
Already, which is the producer of YUMS
shoes, in federal court in Manhattan,
claiming that one of Already's designs
infringed a Nike trademark. Already denied
the infringement but also filed a
counterclaim challenging the validity of
Nike's mark. According to Already's
petition for writ of certiorari-filed by
James Dabney of Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson-Nike "abruptly"
changed course in March 2010 and delivered
a "Covenant Not to Sue" to Already,
promising not to sue over any of the
company's current or previous shoe designs.
Nike moved to dismiss its own complaint
with prejudice and asked U.S. District Judge
Richard Sullivan to dismiss Already's
counterclaim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Already certainly had no problem with Nike
dropping the infringement suit but urged the
court to keep its invalidity counterclaim

alive. In January 2011 Sullivan sided with
Nike, finding that Already was no longer
exposed to potential litigation based on the
trademark, so the court did not have
jurisdiction over the counterclaim. In
November 2011 a three-judge panel of the
2nd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
Sullivan's order, saying the "breadth of
(Nike's) covenant not to sue and the
improbability of future infringement" meant
that there was no live controversy that
would give the district court jurisdiction.
(The opinion was written by Circuit Judge
Raymond Lohier for a panel that also
included judges Debra Ann Livingston and
Pierre Leva!.)
Already's cert petition argued that the 2nd
Circuit's decision created a circuit split with
a 2000 ruling by the 9th Circuit. That ruling,
in a case called Bancroft & Masters v.
A1Igllsta National, held that a promise not to
assert a registered trademark did not divest
the lower cOUli of jurisdiction to hear
challenges to the mark at issue.
Should the Supreme Court side with
Already, the balance of power during
litigation and settlement negotiations would
shift noticeably from the mark holder to the
accused infringer, said Jason Rantanen, an
associate professor of law at the University
of Iowa who blogs at PatentlyO. As things
stand, when rights holders sue to protect
their marks, they risk invalidity challenges.
If the 2nd Circuit ruling for Nike stands,
Rantanen said, a trademark or patent holder
who's worried about such a challenge could
just pull the relevant mark from the
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litigation and promise not to enforce it
against the alleged infringer. A finding for
Already, on the other hand, would likely
force patent and trademark owners to think a
little more carefully about which marks they
want to risk enforcing. "Once you place
your irons in the fire, it (would be) much
harder to pull them out," Rantanen said.
Wilmer Cutler Hale Pickering and Dorr IP
Chair Donald Steinberg, who is not involved
in the case, said that the issue is the breadth
of protection a mark holder should receive
from a promise not to sue. Because that is a
fact-specific question (i.e., what does the nosuit covenant say?), Steinberg said, it's
possible the court will focus more on
general guidance than a strict rule.
Specific facts aside, the reach of intellectual

property has been of interest to the high
court lately. In recent decisions, including
March's Mayo Collaborative Sen1ices v.
Promethells Laboratories, which invalidated
a process patent for correlations between
blood test results and patient health, the
Supreme COUli has taken an interest in the
broader policy question of how far rights
holders' powers should extend, Steinberg
said.
Thomas Goldstein of Goldstein & Russell
and attorneys from Banner & Witcoff
handled Nike's brief opposing cert.
Attorneys from Dickstein Shapiro also
represented Nike at the 2nd Circuit.
Goldstein's office directed me to a Nike
spokesperson, who declined to comment.
(Reporting by Erin Geiger Smith)
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"Supreme Court Looks to Take Trademark Standing Case
Following Covenant-not-to-Sue"
Patently-O
April 16,2012
Dennis Crouch
Nike sued YUMS back in 2009 alleging
trademark infringement, unfair competition,
and dilution under both federal and NY state
law. The complaint included the image
below comparing YUMS brand shoes with
Nike's federal trademark registration
number 3,451,905. The design is related to
N ike's Air Force 1 shoe that was first
released in 1982. The Yums intentionally
retro look is apparently fashionable for
skaters and freestyle BMX riders. (The
image does not show the shoes' creative
soles.)

After being sued, YUMS counterclaimedseeking to cancel the registration. However,
before the court could reach a decision on
the merits, Nike's attorneys at Banner &
Witcoff provided YUMS with a covenantnot-to-sue on the AF1 design rights. In the
document, Nike wrote that YUMS brand
"no longer infringe or dilute the Nike Mark
at a level sufficient to warrant the substantial
time and expense of continued litigation."
The covenant was limited to YUMS current
shoes as well as 'colorable imitations' of
current lines. In particular, Nike promised
to:
refrain from making any claim(s) or
demand(s), or from commencing,
causing, or permitting to be
prosecuted any action in law or

equity, against [Yums] or any of its
[successors or customers], on
account of any possible cause of
action based on or involving
trademark
infringement,
unfair
competition, or dilution, under state
or federal law in the United States
relating to the [Nike eAir Force 1
Mark] based on the appearance of
any of [Yums]'s current and/or
previous footwear product designs,
and any colorable imitations thereof,
regardless of whether that footwear
is produced, distributed, offered for
sale, adveliised, sold, or otherwise
used in commerce before or after the
Effective Date of this Covenant.
YUMS was apparently happy with the
document, but not fully satiated. Rather,
YUMS maintained its declaratory judgment
lawsuit-arguing that the Nike Mark
continued to improperly chill its innovative
marketing efforts. However, the district
court dismissed the case-finding that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because
there was no ongoing case or controversy.
ImpOliant for its ruling, YUMS had not
taken any "meaningful steps" toward
developing a new potentially infringing
product not covered by the covenant-not-tosue.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed,
holding specifically that the cancelation
power under 15 U.S.C. § 1119 does not
provide federal courts with an independent
basis for jurisdiction absent an actual caseor-controversy between the parties.
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Supreme Court: Now, YUMS has appealed
to the US Supreme Court-relying upon the
expertise of Jim Dabney and Prof John
Duffy (of KSR fame) to bring their case.
They raise the simple question: "Whether a
federal district court is divested of Aliicle III
jurisdiction over a party's challenge to the
validity of a federally registered trademark if
the registrant promises not to asseli its mark
against the party's then-existing commercial
activities." The complaint raises a circuit
split between the Second Circuit here and
the Ninth Circuit, which is much more
friendly to OJ trademark actions in this type
of situation. In addition, the petition
highlights Supreme COUli precedent that
suggest broad jurisdiction should be

available to challenge the validity of suspect
intellectual property rights. See Lear, Inc. v.
Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969), Medlmm1lne,
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007),
Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc.,
508 U.S. 83 (1993), and Scott Paper Co. v.
Marca/lls Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
The Supreme Court has now asked Nike to
respond to the petition-due May 4. This
move greatly increases the odds that the
petition will eventually be granted.
Of interest, a key element of the Myriad
gene patent case is whether the ACLU and
AMP have standing to sue. This case may
shed further light on that outcome.

312

"Supreme Court to Decide Whether Patent
Bullies Can Hit and Run"
The HlIffington Post
June 29, 2012
Daniel B. Ravicher

I've written before on the sad state of patent
quality in our country. Today I'm writing
about a beacon of hope. Earlier this week,
the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case that
could greatly expand the right of the public
to defend itself from bogus patents.
Remember, the granting of a patent is an
intrusive act of government telling you, me
and every other American we cannot do
something.
Jefferson
called
them
"embarrasments," and he was right, they are,
especially when they are completely
undeserved, as a great many of the 4,500
patents issued every week are.
Unfortunately, as unbelievable as it may
sound, there is absolutely nothing you, me
or any other American can do to stop the
government from taking our freedom away
willy nilly by granting meritless patents in
the first place. In fact, the government
makes a lot of money doing so (it makes ten
times as much money when it grants a patent
as when it denies one; which would you
prefer if you were a fat cat bureaucrat?).
This is why it is so important to have ways
to take our freedom back after the
government has stolen it from us. As of
now, that's very hard to do, because the
government knows it has to make it as hard
as possible for us Americans to take back
our freedom in order to "protect the value of
IP" (that's how the Director of the Patent
Office spins the situation), else the Patent
Office won't make as much money giving
our freedom away.
In the Supreme Court case accepted this

week, Nike (yes, that Nike, the famous
sportswear company) sued a much smaller
shoe company called Already, which does
business under the name YUMS, for
allegedly infringing one of its trademarks
relating to the design of a shoe. Already
looked at the trademark and quite quickly
realized that it was completely invalid. (If
you want to know how it's possible for our
government to give out invalid trademarks
and patents, see my talk on the Patent
Pollution Problem. The same government
agency, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, grants both.)
Knowing it was going to lose, Nike decided
to quit and walk off the field before time
expired. In legal terms, what that means is
Nike promised never to sue Already again
for infringing that trademark "for similar
shoes." After making the "promise" and
giving up on its dead loser of a case, Nike
asked the court to dismiss Already's request
that the trademark be declared invalid. In
other words, Nike picked a fight with a
much smaller competitor, realized it was
going to get its butt kicked once the little
guy decided to defend itself, became a total
chicken, and tried to run the other way, all
the while retaining its trademark to assert
against the same little guy again in the future
(because surely Nike will argue new shoes
by Already are not "similar" and therefore
fall outside the "promise" they made).
Nike is not alone in using this hit-and-run
tactic. There are numerous examples of
overly aggressive patent owners doing
exactly the same thing, threatening innocent
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people with completely false claims of
infringement, suing them in court hoping the
burden of defense alone will make them
crumble, but then seeking to drop the entire
case by making a meaningless promise not
to sue once they realize the jig is up because
their patent is completely bogus and the
defendant is seeking to have it invalidated
by the comi. These patent bullies want to
concede the case in order to avoid
permanently losing the right to threaten and
sue again in the future for infringing the
same worthless patent. It's absolutely
disgusting and the people who do this
should be ashamed of themselves. If you
want to start a fight, that's your prerogative,
but you better be ready for the other guy to
finish it. You can't just call time out when
you're on the brink oflosing so you can stmi
over later on when you've got your chutzpah
back. No sir, that's not how we roll here in
America.

Office should be even more "embarrassed"
than Jefferson was back when he was in
charge of deciding what applications should
be granted or denied. The American people
desperately need ways to challenge and
eliminate worthless patents that take away
their freedom. Allowing accused infringers
to maintain challenges against patent holders
who sue for infringement will not only help
fix the patent pollution problem, it will also
make patent holders think twice about the
true strength of their patents before even
asserting them against others. It will thus
greatly reduce anti-competitive overlitigious and just plain cowardly behavior.

There are at least two huge reasons to
celebrate the fact that the Supreme Court
may direct lower courts to permit challenges
to trademarks and patents being used to hitand-run the American people.

Second, allowing validity challenges is
consistent with general American principles
relating to protecting freedom from
improper government restraint.
Like
criminal statutes, patents are governmentissued ways of taking away rights of the
American people to do something, and the
Supreme Court has repeatedly allowed
parties to challenge criminal statutes even
when there was no threat of those statutes
ever being enforced, much less when they
had been used to hit-and-run. And in the last
Supreme Comi case on the right of parties to
challenge patents, the Supreme Court relied
on those other cases challenging criminal
statutes to find that the patent challenge
could proceed even though the potential
infringers were not even likely to be sued by
the patent holder. It's only logical that a
pmiy that has been previously accused of
infringing a patent should be able to
challenge it. Further still, the right to bring a
challenge should stem from the fact that the
existence of the bogus patent is a threat to
freedom in and of itself, especially when the
patent holder has been brandishing it in an
aggressive and threatening way.

First, as previously mentioned, American
patent quality is poor, so poor, the Patent

We'll now have to wait several months
before we get a decision from the Supreme

Not surprisingly, innocently accused parties
are as outraged as I am at this ploy. They
don't want to get sued at all, much less for
infringing invalid trademarks and patents
that would get shredded if they ever truly
had their day in court. Already fought Nike
in both the district court and the court of
appeals for its right to have Nike's
trademark declared invalid, but both courts
let Nike off the hook. So, Already appealed
to the Supreme Court, which, as I say above,
on Monday decided to hear the case. Thank
heavens. At least someone in our judicial
system has some sense and backbone.
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Court in the case, but it would be strange
indeed for them to have taken it merely to
uphold the lower courts' decisions to
dismiss the challenges. Hopefully, the
Already v Nike case will open up new doors
for the American people to take back their

freedom by challenging invalid patents. I'm
going to go buy some YUMS products right
now to show my support. One of my
favorite little cousins is heading to college
this fall and could use some new kicks.
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Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
11-697
Ruling Below: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted,
2012 WL 1252751 (U.S. 2012).
As an international student, Supap Kirtsaeng came from Thailand for his undergraduate and
doctoral education. Kirtsaeng had family in Thailand purchase textbooks and ship them to him.
After using them, Kilisaeng sold these textbooks on eBay to repay the original purchasers, and
kept the remaining profit to himself. Eight of the textbooks he sold were printed by John Wiley
& Sons in Asia. John Wiley & Sons brought suit under the Copyright Act § 602(a)(1), under
which it is impermissible to import a work without the copyright owner's consent. In defense,
Kirtsaeng cited § 109(a) which allows the owner of a lawfully made copy to sell without the
copyright owner's permission. The district court found for John Wiley & Sons, holding that the
first sale doctrine does not extend to goods manufactured abroad and imported into the United
States. On appeal to the COUli of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 2011, the majority upheld the
district court's decision for the plaintiff. Kirtsaeng's request for a rehearing was denied.
Question Presented: How do Section 602(a)(1) of the Copyright Act, which prohibits the
importation of a work without the authority of the copyright's owner, and Section 109(a) of the
Copyright Act, which allows the owner of a copy "lawfully made under this title" to sell or
otherwise dispose of the copy without the copyright owner's permission, apply to a copy that
was made and legally acquired abroad and then imported into the United States?

JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
Supap KIRTSAENG, doing business as Bluechristine99, Defendant-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Decided August 15, 2011
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
CABRANES, Circuit Judge
The "first sale doctrine" in copyright law
permits the owner of a lawfully purchased
copy of a copyrighted work to resell it
without limitations imposed by the
copyright holder. The existence of the
doctrine dates to 1908, when the Supreme
Court held that the owner of a copyright
could not impose price controls on sales of

copies of a copyrighted work beyond the
initial sale. Congress codified the doctrine in
successive Copyright Acts, beginning with
the Copyright Act of 1909.
The principal question presented in this
appeal is whether the first sale doctrine, 17
U.S.c. § 109(a), applies to copies of copyrighted works produced outside of the
United States but imported and resold in the
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United States. Under another basic copyright
statute, it is ordinarily the case that
"[i]mportation into the United States,
without the authority of the owner of copyright under [the Copyright Act], of copies ..
. of a work that have been acquired outside
the United States is an infringement of the
[owner's] exclusive right to distribute
copies .... "
Defendant
contends,
however,
that
individuals may import and resell books
manufactured abroad pursuant to 17 U.S.C.
§ I09(a), which provides that "the owner of
a particular copy . . . lawfully made under
[the Copyright Act], or any person
authorized by such owner, is entitled,
without the authority of the copyright
owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession of that copy."
Defendant's claim is an Issue of first
impression in our Court.

BACKGROUND

fewer internal ink colors, if any, [and] lower
quality photographs and graphics." Joint
App'x at 18. The foreign editions, moreover,
are marked with a legend to designate that
they are to be sold only in a particular
country or geographic region. One example
of such a designation reads as follows:

Authorized for sale in Europe,
Asia, Africa and the Middle East
Only.
This book is authorized for sale in
Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle
East only [and] may not be exported.
ExpOliation from or importation of
this book to another region without
the Publisher's authorization is
illegal and is a violation of the
Publisher's rights. The Publisher
may take legal action to enforce its
rights. The Publisher may recover
damages and costs, including but not
limited to lost profits and attorney's
fees, in the event legal action is
required.

A. The Parties
Plaintiff-appellee John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
("plaintiff or "Wiley") is the publisher of
academic, scientific, and educational
journals and books, including textbooks, for
sale in domestic and international markets.
Wiley relies upon a wholly-owned
subsidiary, John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte
Ltd. ("Wiley Asia"), to manufacture books
for sale in foreign countries. While the
written content of books for the domestic
and international markets is often similar or
identical, books intended for international
markets can differ from the domestic version
in design, supplemental content (such as
accompanying CD-ROMS), and the type
and quality of materials used for printing,
including "thinner paper and different
bindings, different cover and jacket designs,

Defendant Supap Kirtsaeng ("defendant" or
"Kirtsaeng") moved to the United States
from Thailand in 1997 to pursue an
undergraduate degree in mathematics at
Cornell University. According to Kirtsaeng,
he later moved to California to pursue a
doctoral degree.

B. The Instant Action
To help subsidize the cost of his education,
Kirtsaeng allegedly participated in the
following scheme: Between 2007 and
September 8, 2008, Kirtsaeng's friends and
family shipped him foreign edition
textbooks printed abroad by Wiley Asia. In
turn, Kirtsaeng sold these textbooks on
commercial websites such as Bay.com.
Using the revenues generated from the sales,
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On September 8, 2008, Wiley filed this
action against Kirtsaeng in the United States
District COUli for the Southern District of
New York (Donald C. Pogue, Judge of the
United States COUli of International Trade,
sitting by designation), claiming, among
other things, copyright infringement under
17 U.S.C. § 501, trademark infringement
under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a), and unfair
competition under New York state law.
Wiley sought a preliminary and permanent
injunction under 17 U.S.C. § 502(a), and
statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).

2009, Kirtsaeng filed motions in limine to
preclude the introduction at trial of (1) his
online "PayPal" sales records, and
specifically, evidence of his gross revenues
from the sales of the foreign editions of
Wiley's books, and (2) the profits he earned
on unrelated sales activities. From the bench
during a pre-trial conference on November
3, 2009, the District Court granted the
motions in part and denied them in patio The
Court explained that Wiley could not
introduce evidence of profits earned by
Kirtsaeng from the sales of textbooks
produced by other publishers, but "in ...
anticipation that the net worth testimony
[would indicate] that [Kirtsaeng did not
have] significant net worth . . . [Wiley's
counsel had the] right to inquire about
additional revenue s and the profits there
from and where they went in order to make
sure that we had an accurate record about
[Kirtsaeng's] net worth." The Court further
stated that Wiley's counsel "must be careful
not to refer to these [unrelated] sales in any
way as infringing sales, because that would
be entirely improper."

C. Relevant Pre-Trial Proceedings

D. Events at Trial

In anticipation of trial, Kirtsaeng submitted
proposed jury instmctions charging that the
first sale doctrine was a defense to copyright
infringement. By Order dated October 9,
2009, the District Court prohibited Kirtsaeng
from raising this defense and rejected the
applicability of the first sale doctrine to
foreign editions of text-books, holding that
"[t]here is no indication that the imported
books at issue here were manufactured
pursuant to the U.S. Copyright Act . . .
[and,] [t]o the contrary, the textbooks
introduced as evidence purport, on their
face, to have been published outside of the
United States."

At trial, during direct examination, Wiley's
counsel asked Kirtsaeng, "Now sir, if we
were to go back and look at January 1st of
2008, what were your financial assets at that
point in time?"

Kirtsaeng would reimburse his family and
friends for the costs that they incurred
during the process of acquiring and shipping
the books and then keep any remaining
profits for himself. Kirtsaeng claims that,
before selling the textbooks, he sought
advice from friends in Thailand and
consulted "Google Answers," a website
which allows web users to seek research
help from other web users, to ensure that he
could legally resell the foreign editions III
the United States.

On October 23, 2009 and November 3,

The District Court sustained an objection by
Kitisaeng's counsel and a sidebar discussion
followed.
After the sidebar conference and a recess,
the first question by Wiley's counsel to
Kirtsaeng was: "Mr. Kirtsaeng, before the
break we were talking about your net worth
during the period of 1999, correct? Excuse
me. 200.9." Kilisaeng answered "yes."
Wiley's counsel proceeded to ask Kirtsaeng
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At a second sidebar conference, during
which the jury was excused from the
courtroom, the District COUli excluded the
record of the PayPal evidence as "confusing
and unfairly prejudicial."

under the statutory scheme the jury had the
option of awarding up to $150,000 in
damages per infringed work. Second, if the
jury found that Kirtsaeng had proved by a
preponderance of the evidence "that he was
not aware and had no reason to believe that
his acts constituted an infringement of
copyright," the jury could choose to impose
an award of statutory damages as low as
$200 per infringed work. The jury ultimately
found Kirtsaeng liable for willful copyright
infringement of all eight works and imposed
damages of $75,000 for each of the eight
works.

When the jury reentered the courtroom,
Wiley's counsel continued to ask Kirtsaeng
about his revenues from eBay sales.
Although Kirtsaeng's counsel immediately
objected to the line of questioning on the
basis that it had already been "asked and
answered"-an objection the District Court
initially sustained-the Court subsequently
allowed the questioning, explaining that it
was unceliain whether the same questions
had in fact been asked of the witness earlier
in the examination.

Kirtsaeng filed a timely notice of appeal. He
claims that (1) the District Court erred in
holding that the first sale doctrine was not an
available defense in the circumstances
presented; (2) the District Court should have
advised the jury of the first sale doctrine as a
defense to the claim of willful infringement;
and (3) with respect to the jury's assessment
of statutory damages, the admission into
evidence of testimony regarding the amount
of Kirtsaeng's gross receipts was unduly
prej udicial.

At the end of the trial, the District Comi
charged the jury to determine whether
Kirtsaeng had infringed the copy-rights of
each of eight works and whether any such
infringements had been willful. The District
Court explained that, under the statutory
damages scheme found at 17 U.S.C. §
504(c), if the jury found that Kirtsaeng had
infringed Wiley's copyright, it could award
no less than $750 and no more than $30,000
in damages for each infringed work.

DISCUSSION

a series of questions about his "net worth" in
an attempt to impeach his previous
statements. Specifically, he attempted to
enter into evidence a record of Kirtsaeng's
PayPal revenues, showing $1.2 million in
revenues, in contrast to Kilisaeng's previous
testimony that he had earned only $900,000
In revenues.

The District Court identified two exceptions
to this rule. First, the District Court
instructed the jury that, if it found that Wiley
had proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that the infringement was willful,

A. The first sale doctrine does not apply
to goods produced outside of the United
States.
1. Standard of review

The threshold question is whether, pursuant
to § 109(a) of the Copyright Act, see note 1,
ante, the District Court correctly determined
that the phrase "lawfully made under this
title" does not include copyrighted goods
manufactured abroad.
Where the decision of a district court
"presents only a legal issue of statutory
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interpretation . . . [w]e reVIew de novo
whether the district court correctly
interpreted the statute."

first had occasion to address the interplay
between § 602(a)(l) and § 109(a) in Quality
King Distributors, Inc. v. L 'anza Research
International, Inc.

2. Interpreting the First-Sale Doctrine
In the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress
enacted what is now 17 U.S.c. § 602(a)(1).
That section provides:
Importation into the United States,
without the authority of the owner of
copyright under this title, of copies
or phonorecords of a work that have
been acquired outside the United
States is an infringement of the
exclusive right to distribute copies or
phonorecords under section 106,
actionable under section 501.
Even if the conduct at issue in this case is
otherwise covered by this statutory
language, Kirtsaeng contends that he is
shielded from any liability under the
Copyright Act by § 109( a), see note 1, ante.
Again, in relevant part, that section
provides: "Notwithstanding the provisions
of section 106(3) [of the Copyright Act], the
owner of a particular copy . . . lawfully
made under this title, or any person
authorized by such owner, is entitled,
without the authority of the copyright
owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession of that copy." Section 109(a) is a
codification of the longstanding "first sale
doctrine."
There is at least some tension between §
602(a)(l), which seemingly seeks to give
copyright holders broad control over the
circumstances in which their copyrighted
material may be imported (directly or
indirectly) into the United States, and §
109(a), which limits the extent to which the
copyright holder may limit distribution
following an initial sale. The Supreme Court

Qllality King involved the sales practices of
L'anza Research International, a California
corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing and selling shampoos,
conditioners, and other hair care products.
L'anza sold its products domestically and
internationally, but its prices to foreign
distributors were 35% to 40% lower than the
prices charged to its domestic distributors.
Lanza brought suit against Quality King
Distributors, Inc., which had purchased
shipments of L'anza's products from one of
L'anza's foreign distributors and then
reimported the products into the United
States for resale. L'anza alleged that Quality
King's actions violated its "exclusive rights
under 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501 and 602 to
reproduce and distribute the copyrighted
material in the United States." The Supreme
Court heard the case in order to decide the
question of "whether the 'first sale' doctrine
endorsed in § 109(a) is applicable to
imported copies."
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court
held that § 109(a), operating in combination
with § 106(3), does in fact limit the scope of
§ 602(a). However, there was a key factual
difference at work in Q1Iality King that is of
critical importance to our disposition of the
instant appeal. In Q1Iality King, the
copyrighted items in question had all been
manufactured in the United States. Indeed,
this important fact provided the basis for
Justice Ginsburg's brief concurring opinion,
in which she explained: "This case involves
a 'round trip' journey, travel of the copies in
question from the United States to places
abroad, then back again. I join the Comt's
OpInIOn recognizing that we do not today
resolve cases in which the allegedly
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infringing
abroad."

impOlts

were

manufactured

Although the maJonty opmlOn did not
directly address the question of whether §
I09(a) can apply to items manufactured
abroad, the opinion contains instructive
dicta that guides our disposition of the issue.
In particular, the Court took pains to explain
ways in which § 109(a) and § 602(a) do, and
do not, overlap. As the Court stated:
"[ A ]lthough both the first sale doctrine
embodied in § 109(a) and the exceptions in
§ 602(a) may be applicable in some
situations, the former does not subsume the
latter; those provisions retain significant
independent meaning." For instance, §
602(a) "encompasses copies that are not
subject to the first sale doctrine-e.g.,
copies that are lawfully made under the law
of another country[.]" The COUlt even
pondered the following hypothetical:
If the author of [a] work gave the
exclusive United States distribution
rights-enforceable under the Actto the publisher of the United States
edition and the exclusive British
distribution rights to the publisher of
the British edition, . . . presumably
only those made by the publisher of
the U.S. edition would be 'lawfully
made under this title' within the
meaning of § I09(a). The first sale
doctrine would not provide the
publisher of the British edition who
decided to sell in the American
market with a defense to an action
under § 602( a) (or, for that matter, to
an action under § 106(3), ifthere was
a distribution of the copies).
In these passages, the Court suggests that
copyrighted material manufactured abroad
cannot be subject to the first sale doctrine
contained in § I09(a).

The Supreme COUlt recently seemed poised
to transform this dicta into holding when it
granted a writ of certiorari to review the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Omega S.A. v.
Costco Wholesale Corp. That case involved
the importation into the United States of
Omega-brand watches by unidentified third
parties without the permission of Omega;
the watches were ultimately purchased and
resold by Costco Wholesale Corporation.
The Ninth Circuit maintained its well-settled
position that § 109(a) does not apply to
items manufactured outside of the United
States unless they were previously impOlted
and sold in the United States with the
copyright holder's permission. After hearing
oral argument, an equally divided Supreme
Court (with Justice Kagan recused) was
obliged to affirm the judgment rendered by
the Ninth Circuit.
Without fmther guidance from the Supreme
COUlt, we now consider the extent to which
the protections set forth in § 109(a) may
apply to items manufactured abroad. In
doing so, we rely on the text of § I09(a), the
structure of the Copyright Act, and the
Supreme Court's opinion in Quality King.

3. Textual Analysis
We start, of course, by turning to the
statutory language enacted by Congress.
"Statutory interpretation always begins with
the plain language of the statute, assuming
the statute is unambiguous." In the instant
case, we are principally called upon to give
meaning to the phrase "lawfully made under
this title" contained in § 109(a).
In arnvmg at a satisfactory textual
interpretation of the statutory language at
issue, we focus primarily on the words
"made" and "under," but this task is
complicated by twa factors: (1) the word
"made" is not a term of art in the Copyright
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Act, and (2) "[t]he word 'under' is [a]
chameleon" and courts "must draw its
meaning from its context." Wiley contends
that we must interpret "lawfully made under
this title" to mean "lawfully made in the
United States." This view of the law-which
was also adopted by the United States in its
amicus brief before the Supreme Court in
Costco-is certainly consistent with the text
of § 109(a). It is also the logical
consequence, Wiley submits, of the general
presumption against the extraterritorial
application of statutes, a presumption which
we have specifically applied to the copyright
laws. Wiley argues that Title 17 only applies
in the United States, and thus, copyrighted
items can only be "made" under that title if
they were physically made in this country.
But the extraterritorial application of Title
17 is more complicated than Wiley allows,
since certain provisions in Title 17 explicitly
take account of activity occurring abroad.
Most notably, § 104(b)(2) provides that
"[t]he works specified by sections 102 and
103, when published, are subject to
protection under this title if the work is first
published in the United States or in a
foreign nation that, on the date of first
publication, is a treaty party[.]"lndeed,
because § 104(b )(2) provides that copyright
protection can apply to works published in
foreign nations, it is possible to interpret §
109(a)'s "lawfully made under this title"
language to mean, in effect, "any work that
is subject to protection under this title."
There are other reasons why a textual
analysis alone is not sufficient to support
Wiley's preferred reading of § 109(a). Most
obviously, if Congress had intended the first
sale doctrine-at least as codified by §
109(a)-to apply only to copies of works
made in the United States, it could have
easily written the statute to say precisely
that. Moreover, "lawfully made under this

title" appears in other provisions of Title 17
where it is at least arguable that Congress
intended this language to apply to copies of
works manufactured outside of the United
States. For instance, § 1006(a)(1) of the
Audio Home Recording Act provides for
applicable royalty payments to be made to
"any interested copyright party whose
musical work or sound recording has been
embodied in a digital musical recording or
an analog musical recording lawfully made
under this title that has been distributed .... "
It is the view of the U.S. Copyright Office
that distribution of royalty payments under
this Act is not limited to those recordings
manufactured in the United States.
But while a textual reading of § 109(a) does
not compel the result favored by Wiley, it
does not foreclose it either. The relevant text
is simply unclear. "[L]awfully made under
this title" could plausibly be interpreted to
mean any number of things, including: (1)
"manufactured in the United States," (2)
"any work made that is subject to protection
under this title," or (3) "lawfully made under
this title had this title been applicable."
4. Section 602(a)(1) and Quality King
Confronted with an utterly ambiguous text,
we think it best to adopt an interpretation of
§ 109(a) that best comports with both §
602(a)(1) and the Supreme Court's opinion
in Quality King.
Section 602(a)(1) prohibits the impOliation
into the United States of copies of
copyrighted works acquired abroad without
the authorization of the copyright holder.
This provision is obviously intended to
allow copyright holders some flexibility to
divide or treat differently the international
and domestic markets for the particular
copyrighted work. If the first sale doctrine
codified in § 109(a) only applies to
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copyrighted
copies
manufactured
domestically, copyright holders would stilI
have a free hand-subject, of course, to
other relevant exceptions enumerated in
Title 17, such as those in §§ 107, 108, and
602(a)(3)-to control the circumstances in
which copies manufactured abroad could be
legally imported into the United States. On
the other hand, the mandate of § 602(a)(1)that "[i]mportation into the United States,
without the authority of the owner of
copyright under [the Copyright Act], of
copies ... of a work that have been acquired
outside the United States is an infringement
of the [owner's] exclusive right to distribute
copies"-would have no force in the vast
majority of cases if the first sale doctrine
was interpreted to apply to every copy
manufactured abroad that was either made
"subject to protection under Title 17," or
"consistent with the requirements of Title 17
had Title 17 been applicable." This reading
of the Copy-right Act militates in favor of
finding that § 109(a) only applies to
domestically manufactured works. While the
Ninth Circuit in Omega held that § 109(a)
also applies to foreign-produced copies of
works sold in the United States with the
permission of the copyright holder, that
holding relied on Ninth Circuit precedents
not adopted by other courts of appeals.
Accordingly, while perhaps a close call, we
think that, in light of its necessary interplay
with § 602(a)(1), § 109( a) is best interpreted
as applying only to copies manufactured
domesticall y.
In adopting this view, we are comfOlied by
the fact that our interpretation of § 109( a) is
one that the Justices appear to have had in
mind when deciding Q1Iality King. There,
the COUli reasoned, admittedly in dicta, that
§ 602(a)(1) had a broader scope than §
109(a) because, at least in part, § 602(a)( 1)
"applies to a category of copies that are

neither piratical nor 'lawfully made under
this title.' That category encompasses copies
that were 'lawfully made' not under the
United States Copyright Act, but instead,
under the law of some other country." This
last sentence indicates that, in the Court's
view, copies "lawfully made" under the laws
of a foreign country-though perhaps not
produced in violation of any United States
laws-are not necessarily "lawfully made"
insofar as that phrase is used in § 109(a) of
our Copyright Act.
Applying these principles to the facts of this
case, we conclude that the District COUli
correctly decided that Kilisaeng could not
avail himself of the first sale doctrine
codified by § 109(a) since all the books in
question were manufactured outside of the
United States. In sum, we hold that the
phrase "lawfully made under this Title" in §
109(a) refers specifically and exclusively to
copies that are made in territories in which
the Copyright Act is law, and not to foreignmanufactured works.
We freely acknowledge that this is a
patiicularly difficult question of statutory
construction in light of the ambiguous
language of § 109(a), but our holding is
supported by the structure of Title 17 as well
as the Supreme Court's opinion in Q1Iality
King.
If
we
have
misunderstood
Congressional purpose in enacting the first
sale doctrine, or if our decision leads to
policy consequences that were not foreseen
by Congress or which Congress now finds
unpalatable, Congress is of course able to
correct our judgment.

B. The District Court did not err in its
instructions to the jury.
"We review jury instructions de novo, and
reverse only when the charge, viewed as a
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whole, constitutes prejudicial error."
Kirtsaeng claims that the District Court
erred by rejecting proposed jury instructions
that acknowledged that the applicability of
the first sale doctrine to foreign-produced
goods was an unresolved question in the
federal courts. Specifically, Kirtsaeng argues
that he was prejudiced by the Court's failure
to charge that the first sale doctrine was an
unsettled area of law because the charge was
essential to his argument that he had
performed presak internet research regarding
the legality of his sales and therefore had not
"willfully" infringed the copyrights.
It is undisputed that Kirtsaeng's counsel did
not object to the final jury instructions
during trial. "[F]ailure to object to a jury
instruction . . . prior to the jury retiring
results in a waiver of that objection."
Nonetheless, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 51 (d)(2), we "may consider a
plain error in the instruction that has not
been preserved as required [under Rule 51]
if the error affects substantial rights."
"To constitute plain error, a court's action
must contravene an established rule of law."
Kirtsaeng does not meet his burden under
this stringent standard. Although the District
Court was free to permit the jury to consider
the unsettled state of the law in determining
whether Kirtsaeng's conduct was willful, we
can find no binding authority for the
proposition that it was required to do so.
Furthermore, Kilisaeng was provided ample
opportunity to introduce evidence at trial
and to argue to the jury that his internet
research had led him to believe that his
conduct was not unlawful. Accordingly, we
cannot conclude that the District Court
plainly erred in declining to give Kilisaeng's
proposed instruction.

C. The District Court did not err in
allowing into evidence the amount of
defendant's gross revenues.
Kilisaeng argues that admission of evidence
regarding his gross revenues prejudiced him
by confusing the jury as to the amount of
damages that should have been awarded to
Wiley. He suggests that the majority of his
revenues came from the sale of other
publishers' used volumes, many of which
were produced in the United States, and
claims that because of the evidence of
revenues that the judge permitted to be
presented to the jury, he was inappropriately
forced to pay high statutory damages.
To determine whether evidence of the
amount of defendant's gross revenues was
properly admitted, ordinarily we first
determine the appropriate standard of
review. As stated above, where a party does
not contemporaneously object to an
evidentiary ruling, that party must
demonstrate that the District Court
committed "plain error." However, even if a
proper objection was asselied in a timely
fashion, we accord "considerable deference
to a district court's decision to admit ...
evidence" pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 403(b) and will reverse a district
court's evidentiary ruling only if it
constitutes an abuse of discretion. When we
review a district court's "judgment
regarding the admissibility of a particular
piece of evidence under [Federal Rule of
Evidence] 403, we generally maximize its
probative value and minimize its prejudicial
effect." Here, however, we need not reach
the question of whether Kirtsaeng's counsel
properly objected to the admission of
evidence regarding his gross revenues
because we hold that admission of the
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evidence by the District COUli was not error
or an abuse of discretion, and certainly not
plain error.
At trial, the jury awarded $75,000 in
statutory damages per copyrighted work for
Kirtsaeng's willful infringement of eight
works. Under the relevant statutory
provision, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c), see note 10,
ante, the jury could have awarded damages
of up to $150,000 per copyrighted work.
Because abundant evidence was available to
support the jury's finding of willfulness, the
admission of information about Kirtsaeng's
revenues was not prejudicial-that is, the
jury could have imposed the same amount of
damages without knowledge of Kirtsaeng's
revenues. For example, the books m
question clearly stated the following:
This book is authorized for sale [in a
foreign region] only and may not be
exported out of this region.
Exportation from or impOliation of
this book to another region without
the Publisher's authorization, is
illegal and is a violation of the
Publisher's rights. The Publisher
may take legal action to enforce its
rights. The Publisher may recover
damages and costs, including but not
limited to lost profits and attorney's
fees, in the event legal action is
required.
In these circumstances, it does not seem
anomalous or extraordinary that the jury
made the findings it did, and we see no
reason to conclude that the District Court's
decision was improper under Rule 403(b).

CONCLUSION
To summarize, we hold that (l) the first sale
doctrine does not apply to copies
manufactured outside of the United States;

(2) the District Court did not err in declining
to instruct the jury regarding the unsettled
state of the first sale doctrine; and (3) the
District Court did not err in admitting
evidence of Kitisaeng's gross revenues.
Accordingly, the judgment of the District
COUli is AFFIRMED.

J. GARVAN MURTHA, District Judge,
dissenting:
As noted by the majority, the application of
the first sale doctrine when a copy is
manufactured outside the United States is an
issue of first impression in this Circuit. The
Supreme Court has recently considered the
issue but unfortunately provided no specific
guidance. Unlike the majority, I conclude
the first sale defense should apply to a copy
of a work that enjoys United States
copyright
protection
wherever
manufactured. Accordingly, I respectfully
dissent.
The Copyright Act sections that are
pertinent to this appeal-17 U.S.c. §§
106(3), 109(a), and 602(a)(1)-are set out in
the opinion of the majority. The distribution
right of § l06(3) primarily protects a
copyright owner's ability to control the
terms on which her work enters the market.
The first sale doctrine of § 109(a) limits the
scope of this distribution right. Finally, §
602(a)(I) addresses the extent to which the
distribution right allows a copyright owner
to also control importation of copies of her
work.
The Supreme Court has held a copyright
owner's § 602 (a) right to control the
impOliation of copies of her work is
derivative of § 106(3)'s distribution right,
which is subject to the first sale doctrine.
Q1Iality King Distrib. v. L 'anza Research
1nt'1 Inc., 523 U.S. 135. The Court noted
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"the text of § 602(a) itself unambiguously
states that the prohibited importation is an
infringement of the exclusive distribution
right 'under section 106, actionable under
section 501.'" Because the rights granted in
§ 106(3) are "subject to sections 107
through 122," the copyright owner's power
to limit importation is qualified by the first
sale doctrine of § 109(a).
The issue is whether this holding can be
extended to copies manufactured outside the
United States. The Q1lality King Court held
the first sale doctrine applies to imported
copies that were made in the United States.
Here, the district court held-and the
majority affirms-the doctrine does not
apply to imported copies that were made
abroad because § 109(a) applies only to
copies that are "lawfully made under this
title,"
and
that
means
physically
manufactured in the United States. The
court's decision is based on the following
dicta in Q1lality King:
Even in the absence of a market
allocation agreement between, for
example, a publisher of the United
States edition and a publisher of the
British edition of the same work,
each such publisher could make
lawful copies. If the author of the
work gave the exclusive United
States distribution rights-enforceable
under the Act-to the publisher of the
United States edition and the
exclusive British distribution rights
to the publisher of the British
edition, however, presumably only
those made by the publisher of the
United States edition would be
'lawfully made under this title'
within the meaning of § 109(a). The
first sale doctrine would not provide
the publisher of the British edition
who decided to sell in the American

market with a defense to an action
under § 602(a) ....
I respectfully disagree with the court's
analysis. To apply, § 109(a) requires (1) the
person claiming protection be the owner of
the copy, and (2) the copy was "lawfully
made under this title." 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
Courts have split over the meaning of
"lawfully made under this title," with some
holding it means "legally manufactured ...
within the United States," and others
"confess[ing] some uneasiness with this
construction" and suggesting "lawfully
made under this title" refers not to the place
a copy is manufactured but to the lawfulness
of its manufacture as a function of U.S.
copyright law.
The statutory text does not refer to a place of
manufacture: It focuses on whether a
particular copy was manufactured lawfully
under title 17 of the United States Code. 17
U.S.C. § 109(a). The United States law of
copyrights is contained in title 17.
Accordingly, the lawfulness of the
manufacture of a particular copy should be
judged by U.S. copyright law. A U.S.
copyright owner may make her own copies
or authorize another to do so. 17 U.S.C. §
106(1). Thus, regardless of place of
manufacture, a copy authorized by the U.S.
rightsholder is lawful under U.S. copyright
law. Here, Wiley, the U.S. copyright holder,
authorized its subsidiary to manufacture the
copies abroad, which were purchased and
then imported into the United States.
This interpretation of "lawfully made" is
supp011ed by the language of the Copyright
Act as a whole. For example, Congress used
the phrase "under this title" in multiple
sections of the Act to describe the scope of
rights created by the Act. However, "[ w]hen
Congress
considered
the
place
of
manufacture to be imp011ant . . . the
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statutory language clearly expresses that
concern." Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1098 n. 1.
F or example, § 601 (a), the "manufacturing
requirement," provides:
Prior to July 1, 1986, and except as
provided by subsection (b), the
importation
into
or
public
distribution in the United States of
copies of a work consisting
preponderantly
of
nondramatic
literary material that is in the English
language and is protected 1lnder this
title is prohibited unless the portions
consisting of such material have
been man1lfact1lred in the United
States or Canada.
17 U.S.C. § 601(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Also, as the majority points out, § 104(b)(2)
provides "[t]he works specified by sections
102 and 103, when published, are subject to
protection under this title if the work is first
published in the United States or in a
foreign nation ...." 17 U.S.C. § 104(b)(2)
(emphasis added). If Congress intended §
109(a) to apply only to copies manufactured
in the United States, it could have stated
"lawfully manufactured in the United States
under this title." As Congress did not
include "manufactured in the United States"
in § 109(a), though it was clearly capable of
doing so as demonstrated by § 601(a), the
omission suppOlis the conclusion that
Congress did not intend the language
"lawfully manufactured under this title" to
limit application of § 109(a) to only copies
manufactured in the United States.
As noted in the majority opinion, supra note
14, the first sale doctrine originated in
Babbs-Merrill Co. v. Stra1ls. There the
Supreme COUli held defendant retailer's
sales of a copyrighted book for less than the
price noted on the copyright page was not a
copyright violation. "The purchaser of a

book, once sold by authority of the owner of
the copyright, may sell it again, although he
could not publish a new edition of it." Once
the copyright holder has controlled the terms
on which the work enters the market, i.e.,
the purpose of the distribution right, "the
policy favoring a copyright monopoly for
authors gives way to the policy opposing
restraints of trade and restraints on
alienation." Accordingly, the Babbs-Merrill
Court held the copyright owner did not have
the right to control the terms of subsequent
sales.
The common law policy against restraints on
trade and alienation is not limited by the
place of manufacture. Under the 1909
(codifying the Babbs-Merrill holding) and
1947 Copyright Acts, the first sale doctrine
applied to "any copy of a copyrighted work
the possession of which has been lawfidly
obtained" The Supreme Court noted
"[t]here is no reason to assume Congress
intended either § 109(a) or the earlier
codifications of the doctrine to limit its
broad scope." The changed wording in the
current version of § 109(a)-"lawfully made
under this title"-from the prior versions"possession of which has been lawfully
obtained"-should likewise not be presumed
to do so.
Economic justifications
also
support
applicability of the first sale doctrine to
foreign made copies. Granting a copyright
holder unlimited power to control all
commercial activities involving copies of
her work would create high transaction costs
and lead to uncertainty in the secondary
market. An owner first would have to
determine the origin of the copy-either
domestic or foreign-before she could sell
it. If it were foreign made and the first sale
doctrine does not apply to such copies, she
would need to receive permission from the
copyright holder. Such a result would
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provide greater copyright protection to
copies manufactured abroad than those
manufactured
domestically:
Once
a
domestic copy has been sold, no matter
where the sale occurred, the copyright
holder's right to control its distribution is
exhausted. I do not believe Congress
intended to provide an incentive for u.s.
copyright holders to manufacture copies of
their work abroad.
The Ninth Circuit has attempted to
circumvent this perpetual right when a copy
is made abroad by holding the first sale
doctrine can apply to copies made outside
the United States but only after there has
been one authorized sale here. This
precedent carried over into the reasoning in
Omega S.A. The Supreme Court, however,
provided no guidance as to its views on the
Ninth Circuit's imperfect solution, which is
judicially created. This interpretation finds
no support in the statutory text and is in
direct conflict with the pOliion of the
Supreme Court's Quality King decision
which noted that where a sale occurs IS
irrelevant for first sale purposes.
Supporters of limiting the application of the
first
sale
doctrine
to
domestically
manufactured copies rely on the argument
that applying the doctrine to foreign made
copies would render § 602(a) "virtually
meaningless." (Appellee's Br. at 15-17.)
However, § 602(a) will always apply to
copies of a work that have not been sold or
are piratical copies. It also applies to copies
of a work not lawfully manufactured under
title 17 but lawfully manufactured under
some other source of law, as in the Quality
King dicta, and to copies not in the
possession of the "owner," e.g., a bailee,
licensee, consignee or one whose possession
of the copy was unlawful. Further, § 602(a)

itself states unauthorized importation is an
infringement of the exclusive distribution
right of § 106, which as noted above is
subject to the first sale doctrine of § 109(a).
Nothing in § 109(a) or the history, purposes,
and policies of the first sale doctrine limits it
to copies of a work manufactured in the
United States. That leaves the question
whether the Quality King dicta "sp[ eaks]
directly to whether the first sale doctrine
applies to copies manufactured abroad."
That dicta, however, makes no reference to
the place of manufacture, Quality King, and
therefore does not speak directly to the issue
of applicability of the doctrine to foreign
made copies. Further, the dicta states the
first sale doctrine would not provide a
defense to the publisher who sold copies in
the American market. Of course, because in
that situation there has been no first sale
unlike here, where the issue is whether the
first sale doctrine is available as a defense to
the subsequent purchaser.
In Quality King, Justice Ginsburg, in a
concurrence joined by no other justice,
noted: "I Jom the Court's opmlon
recognizing that we do not today resolve
cases in which the allegedly infringing
imports were manufactured abroad." That
issue, however, was squarely before the
Supreme Court in Omega and four justices
presumably did not agree the Quality King
dicta directly addresses it or constitutes the
Court's current view. In light of the above
analysis, I agree with the majority that it is a
"close call," supra p. 221, and I would
conclude the first sale doctrine applies to
foreign manufactured copies.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully
dissent.
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"Thai Student's Money-Making Effort at Center of
Supreme Court Copyright Case"
The Washington Post
April 16,2012
Mark Sherman
The Supreme COUli agreed Monday to
decide a copyright case with important
implications for the large and growing
markets in discount and Internet sales.

practice of manufacturers to price items
more cheaply abroad than in the United
States. This phenomenon is sometimes
called a parallel market or gray market.

The justices said they will hear an appeal
from a Thai student doing graduate work in
the United States who tried to make ends
meet by re-selling textbooks that family and
friends first purchased abroad. A jury
awarded textbook publisher John Wiley &
Sons $600,000 after deciding that math
graduate student Supap Kirtsaeng infringed
on the company's copyrights.

The high court already has ruled that
copyright protections do not apply when the
goods are made in the U.S., sold abroad and
reimported. This case concerns only foreignmade items.

The issue at the Supreme Court is whether
U.S. copyright protection applies to items
that are made abroad, purchased abroad and
then resold in the U.S. without the
permission of the manufacturer. The high
court split 4-4 when it tried to answer that
question in a case in 2010 involving Costco
and Swiss watch maker Omega.

Kilisaeng returned to Thailand in 2010 after
doing graduate work at the University of
Southern California, said his lawyer, Joshua
Rosenkranz. Earlier, he received his
undergraduate
degree
from
Cornell
University in Ithaca, N.Y.

Justice Elena Kagan sat out the Costco case,
but will join the other justices in hearing the
new dispute.
Discount sellers like Costco and Target and
Internet giants eBay and Amazon help form
an estimated $63 billion annual market for
goods that are purchased abroad, then
impolied and resold without the permission
of the manufacturer. The U.S.-based sellers,
and consumers, benefit from the common

Federal judges have come to different
conclusions about whether copyright law
applies in Kirtsaeng's and other cases.

While at USC, Kirtsaeng arranged for
family and friends living abroad to purchase
textbooks and ship them to him. He resold
the copies on eBay. Eight textbooks sold by
Kilisaeng were published by Wiley's Asian
subsidiary. The company sued the student in
federal court in New York.
eBay was among the outside parties urging
the court to hear the case and decide it in
Kirtsaeng's favor.
The case will be argued in the fall.
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"The Wait for Kirtsaeng Is Over"
IP In Brief
August 15, 2011
Andrew Berger
The cloud lingering over the gray market
industry since the Supreme Court split 4-4 in
Castea just got a lot darker. Gray market
goods are those made by the copyright
holder abroad and then imported into this
country without the permission of the
copyright holder. Just last week it seemed
the 2d Circuit would never decide John
Wiley v. Kirtsaeng argued in May of 2010.
Today in 2-1 decision the 2d Circuit (2-1)
affirmed the result below.
The 2d Circuit held that § 602 (a)(1) of the
Copyright Act trumps the first sale doctrine
in § 109(a) of that Act with respect to goods
made abroad and then imported into this
country. But the tension between § 602
(a)(1) and § 109(a) is far from over.
Kirtsaeng admitted the case raised "a
particularly difficult question of statutory
construction" and the result was therefore a
"close call" And Judge Murtha's wellreasoned dissent in Kirtsaeng adds to the
uncertainty.
Sections 109 and 602 are in tension because
they lead to opposing results. Section 109,
the first sale doctrine, provides that a
copyright holder loses control over the
distribution of goods once the holder has
made a first sale. But Section 602(a)(1)
provides that a copyright holder may retain
control over the distribution of copyrighted
goods made abroad if they were then
imported into the US without the permission
of the copyright holder. Control is
maintained because §602( a)(1) states that
unauthorized importation of goods into the
U.S. infringes copyright holder's "exclusive
right to distribute ... under section 106."

This tension between these sections was at
play in Kirtsaeng. Mr. Kirtsaeng was
engaged in what some refer to as textbook
arbitrage. He bought text books Wiley made
aboard and intended for distribution abroad
and without Wiley's consent imported and
sold them in this country at prices below
what Wiley charged for the same texts it
manufactured here.
Kirtsaeng sought refuge under the first sale
doctrine. He argued that, once Wiley had
sold these texts abroad, Wiley had exhausted
its first sale rights and therefore he was free
to resell them in the U.S. Kitisaeng relied on
the "subject to" language of section 106 (3).
That language gives the copyright holder the
exclusive right to distribute "subject to" a
number of sections of the Copyright Act,
including section 109. Thus, Kirtsaeng
asserted that, once Wiley exercised its first
sale rights abroad, Wiley lost its exclusive
right to control distribution of the goods
under §§602(a)(I) and 106(3). In other
words, Kirtsaeng stated that Wiley should
not complain that he, as lawful owner of the
goods, resold them here because Wiley had
already received a fair return for those goods
abroad.
The problem for Mr. Kirtsaeng was some
vague and ill-chosen language in the first
sale doctrine. It only applies to copyrighted
goods "lawfully made under this title." But
no one really knows what "lawfully made
under this title" means. As the 2d Circuit
aptly noted in Kirtsaeng, "made is not a
term of ali in the Copyright Act," and the
word "under" is a "chameleon and courts
must draw its meaning from its context."
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Kirtsaeng offered three interpretations of
"lawfully made under this title." This phrase
may refer to (1) goods manufactured in this
country; (2) goods made anywhere that are
"subject to protection under this title [17];"
or (3) goods "lawfully made under this title
had this title been applicable."
The majority in Kirtsaeng opted for the first
interpretation with considerable skepticism,
recognizing that "lawfully made under this
title" "is simply unclear." The lack of clarity
hobbles the opinion.

Kirtsaeng stated that restricting the first sale
doctrine to domestically made goods might
be the "logical consequence" of the
presumption
against
extraterritorial
application of the Copyright Act. Id. at 14.
But the court also acknowledged that
"certain provisions of Title 17 take account
of activity occurring abroad." For instance,
the court stated that "§ 104(b )(2) provides
that copyright protection can apply to works
published in foreign nations."
Moreover,
Kirtsaeng
indicated
that
'''lawfully made under this title' appears in
other provisions of Title 17 where it is at
least arguable that Congress intended this
language to apply to works manufactured
outside of the United States." The court
pointed to § 106(a)(1) of the Audio Home
Recording Act, which provides for royalties
to the copyright owner whose work is
embodied in a digital recording. The court
noted the Copyright Office's view that
royalties under this section are "not limited
to those recordings manufactured in the
United States."
So, in view of this "patiicularly difficult
question" of first impression, what prompted
the Second Circuit to restrict the first sale
doctrine to only those goods made in the
U.S.?

The Second Circuit stated that this result
"best comports" with § 602 (a)(1) and the
Supreme Comi's opinion in Quality King.
The court reasoned that, applying the first
sale doctrine to works made abroad, would
give "no force" to § 602 "in the vast
majority of cases." But, as the dissent
pointed out, § 602 will still apply: "to copies
of a work that have not been sold [abroad]
or are piratical copies;" "to copies of a work
not lawfully manufactured under title 17 but
lawfully manufactured under some other
source of law," and "to copies not in the
possession of the 'owner,' e.g., a bailee,
licensee, consignee or one whose possession
of the copy was unlawful."
The court also indicated that dicta in the
Supreme Court's earlier opinion in Quality
King v. L 'Anza seemed to suggest that § 602
"had a broader scope than § 109(a)" because
§ 602 applied to goods made "under the
laws of some other country." But the
concepts of being lawfully made under the
laws of another country and lawfully made
under this title are not mutually exclusive. If
a U.S. copyright holder makes goods in
Brazil, then the copies are made in
accordance with the Copyright Act (which
gives the holder the right to make copies)
and therefore those goods are lawfully made
under this title as well as presumably under
Brazilian law.
The defendant had appropriately warned that
a finding for Wiley may induce
manufacturers to shift operations overseas to
take advantage of the expanded protections
of § 602. Although the majority touched on
this concern, the comi passed the ball to
Congress, inviting it to "correct our
judgment" "if our decision leads to policy
consequences that were not foreseen by
Congress."

Kirtsaeng raises some troubling questions
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that are the subject of Mr. Kirtsaeng's
petition for en bane review. If the first sale
doctrine no longer applies to any goods
made abroad (as others have warned) even
though imported with the permission of the
copyright holder, has the Second Circuit
given foreign manufacturers the right to
destroy longstanding and enormously
important secondary and rental markets in
this country? In other words, does a
Japanese car manufacturer who impOlis and
sells a car in this country now have the
section 106(3) right to direct the buyer not to
resell it?

Further, the Second Circuit has yet to decide
Pearson v. Arora, argued on January 19,
2011 and Pearson v. K1Imar, argued March
21,2011 both of which raise identical issues.
But Kirtsaeng is now binding Second
Circuit precedent that Arora and Kumar
must follow. Only an intervening change in
the law or en bane review will allow the
Second Circuit to deviate from its holding in
Kirtsaeng. Nevertheless, with the 4-4 split in
Costeo and Judge MUliha's dissent III
Kirtsaeng, there may be more to come.
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"Made in the USA: Does the 'First Sale'
Doctrine Require It?"
Forbes
May 2,2012
Richard Busch
Are used books and CDs legal? The answer
may depend on where the book or CD was
manufactured. People who trade in used
books and CDs should closely watch a case
pending before the Supreme Court that will
determine if the Copyright Act's "first sale"
doctrine
applies
to
"gray market"
copyrighted goods, i.e. those manufactured
abroad but imported to the United States for
resale.
The first sale doctrine provides that after a
copyrighted good, like a CD or a book, has
been sold once, that copy of the work can be
resold without the authorization of the
copyright owner. That means you can
legally buy and sell books and CDs. This
keeps local Nashville favorites like
Grimey's New & Pre loved Music and
McKay Books open for business. It is also a
huge source of revenue for behemoths like
Amazon.com. According to the language of
the Copyright Act, the first sale doctrine
applies as long as the copyrighted good was
"lawfully made under [the Copyright Act]."
The question that follows is what does
"lawfully made under [the Copyright Act]"
mean? This is an easy question if you buy a
book at an authorized retailer like
Nashville's Parnassus Books and resell it a
few miles away at McKay Books. That
locally purchased new book was almost
certainly made under the Copyright Act. It's
a more difficult question if you buy a book
in Thailand and resell it in California.
The United States Supreme COUl1 just
recently agreed to consider what "lawfully

made under [the Copyright Act]" really
means. Does it refer to any work that is
protected under the Copyright Act,
regardless of where it was manufactured? Or
does it mean "manufactured in the United
States," so that only copyrighted goods
manufactured in the United States are
subject to the first sale doctrine? The
Supreme Court first planned to address this
issue a couple of years ago in the case
Omega
S.A.
v.
Cos teo
Wholesale
Corporation, but Justice Kagan had to
recuse herself from participating, and the
remaining justices split 4-4 over the issue.
As a result, the Supreme COUl1 did not
deliver a written opinion or set any
precedent.
The case now before the Supreme Court,

John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng,
involves
the
resale
of
textbooks
manufactured in both the United States and
in Thailand. The publisher, John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., sells its textbooks in both
domestic
and
international
markets,
including Thailand. The domestic and
international versions have mostly the same
content, but the textbooks manufactured in
Thailand differ in design and are made from
lower quality materials. Accordingly, the
textbooks manufactured in Thailand sell at a
much lower price than the United States
verSIOns.
The defendant in the case, Supap Kil1saeng,
a native of Thailand, moved to the United
States to pursue his education. While a
doctoral candidate at the University of
Southern California, Kirtsaeng helped
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subsidize the cost of his education by having
friends and family purchase Wiley textbooks
manufactured in Thailand and ship them to
him for resale on websites like eBay.com.
Wiley learned about Kirtsaeng's business
and sued him for copyright infringement in
the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.
The trial court refused to allow Kirtsaeng to
assert a first sale defense and the jury found
him liable for copyright infringement,
awarding Wiley $600,000 in damages. On
appeal, the Second Circuit agreed that the
first sale doctrine does not apply to
copyrighted goods manufactured outside of
the United States.
Based on the 4-4 split in the Costco case, it's
not clear what the Supreme Court will think
about the Second Circuit's interpretation of
"lawfully made under [the Copyright Act]."
It is clear, however, that Justice Kagan's
view on the matter likely will be the
deciding factor.
The Court's decision could have a big
impact on the gray market for copyrighted
goods, including CDs and possibly even

mp3s (the Southern District of New York
ruled earlier this year that it may be possible
to resell an mp3). This might not affect your
local used book store, but it would likely
have a big impact on sites like Amazon.com
and eBay.com. It also might be good for
content producers like publishers and record
labels. As I discussed in a previous post on
how eliminating CDs and lowering the price
of mp3 albums could encourage more new
sales, websites like Amazon.com often sell
used CDs for less than their mp3
counterparts, with no additional royalties to
the record label, artist, and songwriter
because of the first sale doctrine.
If the Supreme Court agrees with the Second
Circuit and decides that the first sale
doctrine does not apply to albums
manufactured abroad, this will prohibit
people from purchasing foreign gray market
albums and reselling them on Amazon.com
and other similar sites. The result could
mean less used CDs available for sale, an
increase in sales of new CDs or mp3
albums, and more control for content owners
over the distribution of their copyrighted
works.
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"Supreme Court Takes Another Look
at Gray Market Resales"
Reuters
April 17,2012
Erin Geiger Smith
The Supreme Court has decided to take a
second crack at reconciling two apparently
contradictory provisions in the Copyright
Act: one that permits buyers to resell goods
without worrying about permission from
U.S. copyright holders, and another that
controls the importation of copyrighted
material into the United States.
It may sound arcane, but this is a hugelyconsequential issue. The case in which the
Supreme Court granted certiorari or judicial
review involves a Thai graduate student
reselling used foreign-manufactured books
on eBay, but the court's ultimate ruling will
profoundly affect the approximately $63
billion "gray market" business.

On Monday, the Supreme Court agreed to
hear Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, which
stems from one man's enterprise to help pay
his tuition fees. Supap Kirtsaeng, a
University of Southern California graduate
student from Thailand, had family and
friends
buy textbooks
manufactured
internationally and ship them to him in
California. He then resold the books on
eBay
and
pocketed
the
proceeds.
(Kirtsaeng's attorney for the earlier portions
of this case, solo practitioner Sam Israel,
was joined in Supreme Court briefing by
counsel from Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe.
Orrick patiner E. Joshua Rosenkranz said
the firm had been watching the case and
approached Israel about teaming up.)
According to his petition for certiorari
Kirstaeng was a notably well-informed eBay
dealer. He researched the first-sale doctrine

of U.S. copyright law, which entitles the
owner of lawfully-produced work to resell
the work without the authority of the
copyright owner. John Wiley & Sons, whose
Asian subsidiary produced some of the
books Kilisaeng resold, disagreed with the
graduate student's interpretation of the law.
The publisher filed an infringement suit in
Manhattan federal district court in 2008. A
jury eventually found Kirtsaeng liable for
infringing eight works and imposed
statutory damages of $600,000.
But Kirtsaeng is just a small player in the
vast gray market, which includes not only
individuals re-selling items, but also huge
discount businesses like Costco selling
foreign-made goods. By the time his case
reached the 2nd Circuit COUli of Appeals the
Supreme Court had already taken its first
crack at regulating the market. In December
2010, in a 4-to-4 split ruling in which Justice
Elena Kagan did not take part, the high court
affirmed, without written opinion, a ruling
by the 9th Circuit COUli of Appeals, holding
in Costeo Wholesale Corp. v. Omega that
the first-sale doctrine applies only to U.S.made works.
The 2nd Circuit applied the Costco case
when it decided Kirstaeng's case in August
2011, but acknowledged tension in the
copyright law. In a 2-to-1 decision, Judges
Jose Cabranes and Robert Katzmann (with a
dissent from U.S. District COUli Judge 1.
Gat'Van MUliha of Vermont, sitting by
designation) upheld the verdict against the
graduate student, ruling that the first-sale
doctrine applies only to goods made in the
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United States. But the appeals court also
noted a "paIiicularly difficult question of
statutory construction," because another
section of the Copyright Act holds that
importation of copyrighted goods without
the authority of the copyright owner
infringes the holder's right to distribute
copies.
The decision has had the strange impact of
giving foreign manufactures the right "to
control how goods are resold in the
American marketplace," said Andrew
Berger of Tannenbaum Helpern Syracuse &
Hirschtritt, who authors the blog IP In Brief.
He explained the implications via an
extreme hypothetical: He might right afoul
of the 2nd Circuit's Kirstaeng opinion if he
tried to resell his foreign-made Nissan
Altima despite any Nissan claims that
dashboard elements are copyrighted. (That
hypothetical might not even be so crazythe issue in the Costco case was a watch
whose copyrighted component was a logo
on the back.) "The Second Circuit seemed to
say that this that is the kind of control

Congress intended," Berger said.
It'll now be up to the Supreme Court to
decide Congress's intent and reconcile the
gap in rights between U.S. and foreign
manufacturers when it comes to resale.
(Kagan, who will participate this time
around, would seem to be the key vote,
given the high comi's previous 4-to-4 split
in Costco.) Orrick's Rosenkranz, who will
likely argue on behalf of Kirtsaeng, said that
the 100-year-old first-sale doctrine should
also apply to foreign-made goods. "This
notion that we would give foreign made
goods greater protection than local goods
makes no sense at all to me," he said.
Theodore Olson of Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher, who represents John Wiley, did
not return a call for comment. A Wiley
spokesperson sent this statement: "The 2nd
Circuit correctly concluded that those
seeking to profit from the creative works of
others cannot evade our intellectual property
laws by impOliing copies from overseas. We
look forward to defending that decision in
the Supreme Comi."
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Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare Corp.
10-3178
Ruling Below: Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare Corp., 656 F. 3d 189 (3rd Cir. 2011), cert.
granted, 2012 WL 609478 (U.S. 2012).
From April 2007 through December 2007, Symczyk was employed by defendants as a
Registered Nurse at Pennypack Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. On December 4, 2009,
Symczyk initiated a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of herself and all
similarly situated individuals, alleging defendants violated the FLSA when they implemented a
policy subjecting the pay of certain employees to an automatic meal break deduction whether or
not they performed compensable work during their breaks. On February 18, 2010, defendants
filed an answer to Symczyk's complaint and served her with an offer of judgment under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 in the amount of "$7,500.00 in alleged unpaid wages, plus attorneys' fees, costs
and expenses as determined by the Court." Symczyk did not dispute the adequacy of defendants'
offer but nevertheless declined to respond. U.S. District Judge Michael M. Baylson ordered that
the plaintiff would have 90 days to conduct initial discovery before filing her motion to have the
case certified as a collective action. On March 23, 2010, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(l), contending that, because
Symczyk had effectively rejected their Rule 68 offer of judgment. On May 19,2010, the District
Court "tentatively concluded" that defendants' Rule 68 offer mooted the collective action and
that the action should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Symczyk appealed.
Question Presented: Whether a case becomes moot, and thus beyond the judicial power of
Article III, when the lone plaintiff receives an offer from the defendants to satisfy all of the
plaintiffs claims.

Laura SYMCZYK, an individual, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
Appellant

v.
GENESIS HEALTHCARE CORPORATION; ElderCare Resources Corporation d/b/a
Genesis ElderCare.
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed August 31, 2011
[Excerpt: Some footnote and citations omitted.]
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge
Laura Symczyk sought relief under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29U.S.C. §§
207 and 216(b), on behalf of herself and all

others similarly situated. The District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
dismissed Symczyk's complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction after defendants
Genesis HealthCare Corporation and
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ElderCare Resources Corporation extended
an offer of judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 68
in full satisfaction of her alleged damages,
fees, and costs. At issue in this case is
whether a collective action brought under §
216(b) of the FLSA becomes moot when,
prior
to
moving
for
"conditional
certification" and prior to any other plaintiff
opting in to the suit, the putative
representative receives a Rule 68 offer. We
will reverse and remand.

I.
From April 2007 through December 2007,
Symczyk was employed by defendants as a
Registered Nurse at Pennypack Center in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. On December 4,
2009, Symczyk initiated a collective action
under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of
herself and all similarly situated individuals,
alleging defendants violated the FLSA when
they implemented a policy subjecting the
pay of certain employees to an automatic
meal break deduction whether or not they
performed compensable work during their
breaks. On February 18, 2010, defendants
filed an answer to Symczyk's complaint and
served her with an offer of judgment under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 in the amount of"$7,500.00
in alleged unpaid wages, plus attorneys'
fees, costs and expenses as determined by
the COUli." Symczyk did not dispute the
offer but
adequacy of defendants'
nevertheless declined to respond.
The District Court-unaware of the offer of
judgment-held
a
Fed.R.Civ.P.
16
scheduling conference on March 8, 2010.
Two days later, the court entered a
scheduling order providing for "an initial
ninety (90) day discovery period, at the
close of which [Symczyk] will move for
conditional certification under § 216(b) of
the FLSA." Following the court's ruling on
certification, the parties were to have "an

additional six (6) month discovery period, to
commence at the close of any Court-ordered
opt-in window."
On March 23, 2010, defendants filed a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1),
contending that, because Symczyk had
effectively rejected their Rule 68 offer of
judgment, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 68(a) (providing
a plaintiff with 14 days to accept an offer),
she "no longer ha[ d] a personal stake or
legally cognizable interest in the outcome of
this action, a prerequisite to this Court's
subject matter jurisdiction under Atiicle III
of the United States Constitution." Symczyk
objected, citing defendants' strategic attempt
to "pick off' the named plaintiff before the
court could consider her "certification"
motion.
On May 19, 2010, the District Court
"tentatively concluded" that defendants'
Rule 68 offer mooted the collective action
and that the action should be dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In its
memorandum, the court explained:
Symczyk does not contend that other
individuals have joined her collective
action. Thus, this case, like each of
the district court cases cited by
Defendants, which concluded that a
Rule 68 offer of judgment mooted
the underlying FLSA collective
action, involves a single named
plaintiff. In addition, Symczyk does
not contest Defendants' assertion
that the 68 offer of judgment fully
satisfied her claims ....
The cOUli instructed Symczyk to file a brief
in support of continued federal jurisdiction
on her state-law claims and her motion for
class certification under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 by
June 10, 20 I O. Symczyk did so but
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conceded she did not believe the court
possessed an independent basis for
jurisdiction over her state-law claims in the
event her FLSA claim was dismissed. The
District Court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Symczyk's
state-law claims in accordance with 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c) and dismissed those claims
without prejudice. The cOUli also dismissed
Symczyk's FLSA claim with prejudice in
accordance with its earlier memorandum.
Symczyk timely appealed.
II.

A.
Enacted in 1938, the FLSA, 29 U.S.c. § 201
et seq., was designed "to aid the
unprotected, unorganized and lowest paid of
the nation's working population; that is,
those employees who lacked sufficient
bargaining power to secure for themselves a
minimum subsistence wage." Brooklyn Sav.
Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 n. 18
(1945). Under the "collective action"
mechanism set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b),
an employee alleging an FLSA violation
may bring an action on "behalf of himself ..
. and other employees similarly situated,"
subject to the requirement that "[n]o
employee shall be a party plaintiff to any
such action unless he gives his consent in
writing to become such a party and such
consent is filed in the court in which such
action is brought."
Prior to 1947, the FLSA permitted an
aggrieved employee to "designate an agent
or representative to maintain such action for
and in behalf of all employees similarly
situated." Martino v. Mich. Window
Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173, 175 n. 1
(1946). But in response to "excessive
litigation spawned by plaintiffs lacking a
personal interest in the outcome," Congress

eliminate
amended
the
Act
to
"representative action by plaintiffs not
themselves possessing claims." HoffmannLa Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165,
173 (1989). Further altering the collective
action procedure in § 216(b), Congress
inserted a requirement that similarly situated
employees must affirmatively "opt in" to an
ongoing FLSA suit by filing express, written
consents in order to become party plaintiffs.
In deciding whether a suit brought under §
216(b) may move forward as a collective
action, courts typically employ a two-tiered
analysis. During the initial phase, the court
makes a preliminary determination whether
the employees enumerated in the complaint
can be provisionally categorized as similarly
situated to the named plaintiff. If the
plaintiff carries her burden at this threshold
stage, the cOUli will "conditionally certify"
the collective action for the purposes of
notice and pretrial discovery. In the absence
of statutory guidance or appellate precedent
on the proper definition of "similarly
situated," a divergence of authority has
emerged on the level of proof required at
this stage. Some trial courts within our
circuit have allowed a plaintiff to satisfy her
burden simply by making a "substantial
allegation" in her pleadings that she and the
prospective party plaintiffs suffered from a
single decision, plan or policy, but the
majority of our circuit's trial cOUlis have
required the plaintiff to make a "modest
factual showing" that the proposed
recipients of opt-in notices are similarly
situated.
Under the "modest factual showing"
standard, a plaintiff must produce some
evidence, "beyond pure speculation," of a
factual nexus between the manner in which
the employer's alleged policy affected her
and the manner in which it affected other
employees. We believe the "modest factual

339

showing" standard-which works III
harmony with the opt-in requirement to
cabin the potentially massive size of
collective actions-best comports with
congressional intent and with the Supreme
Court's directive that a court "ascertain[ ]
the contours of [a collective] action at the
outset."

representative," see, e.g., id. at 966, his
attorney becomes "class counsel," see, e.g.,
Harkins v. Riverboat Servs., Inc., 385 F.3d
1099, 11 01 (7th Cir.2004), and similarly
situated employees become "potential class
members," see, e.g., In re Family Dollar
FLSA Litig., 637 F.3d 508, 518 (4th
Cir.2011).

After discovery, and with the benefit of "a
much thicker record than it had at the notice
stage," a court following this approach then
makes a conclusive determination as to
whether each plaintiff who has opted in to
the collective action is in fact similarly
situated to the named plaintiff. Morgan v.
Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233,
1261 (11 th Cir.2008). "This second stage is
less lenient, and the plaintiff bears a heavier
burden." Should the plaintiff satisfy her
burden at this stage, the case may proceed to
trial as a collective action.

Despite this judicial gloss on § 216(b), "the
'certification' we refer to here is only the
district court's exercise of [its] discretionary
power, upheld in Hoffmann-La Roche, to
facilitate the sending of notice to potential
class members," and "is neither necessary
nor sufficient for the existence of a
representative action under FLSA." Myers v.
Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 555 n. 10 (2d
Cir.2010); see also Morgan, 551 F.3d at
1261 n. 40. Defendants here rely heavily on
the superficiality of the similarities between
the "certification" processes inherent in Rule
23 class actions and § 216(b) collective
actions in arguing Symczyk could not
purport to "represent" the interests of
similarly situated employees before anyone
had opted in to the action. And, as noted,
expedient adoption of Rule 23 terminology
with no mooring in the statutory text of §
216(b) may have injected a measure of
confusion into the wider body of FLSA
jurisprudence.
Although
"conditional
certification" may not vest a § 216(b)
"class" with the independent legal status that
certification provides a Rule 23 class, see
Trotter v. Klincar, 748 F.2d 1177, 1183 (7th
Cir.1984), this realization does not control
our mootness analysis in the manner
suggested by defendants. Provision of notice
does not transform an FLSA suit into a
"representative action," but, as we will
explain, its central place within the litigation
scheme approved of by the Supreme Court
in Hoffinann-La Roche necessarily shapes
our approach to squaring Rule 68 and §
216(b).

Absent from the text of the FLSA is the
concept of "class celiification." As the
Eighth Circuit has noted, however, "[m]any
courts and commentators ... have used the
vernacular of the Rule 23 class action for
simplification and ease of understanding
when discussing representative cases
brought pursuant to § 16(b) of the FLSA."
Kelley v. Alamo, 964 F.2d 747, 748 n. 1 (8th
Cir.1992). As a result, comis commonly
refer to a plaintiff's satisfaction of her
burden at the notice stage as resulting in
"conditional celiification," see, e.g., R1Iehl v.
Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 389 n. 17 (3d
Cir.2007), or "provisional certification," see,
e.g., Nash v. CVS Caremark Corp., 683
F.Supp.2d 195, 199 (D.R.I.201O). Similarly,
the court's second-step analysis is
traditionally triggered by a defendant's
motion to "decertify the class" on the
ground that its proposed members are not
similarly situated. And, in the same fashion,
a named plaintiff becomes a "class
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B.

Article III of the United States Constitution
limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
"actual 'Cases' and 'Controversies.' " Sprint
Commc 'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554
U.S. 269, 298 (2008) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting). "When the issues presented in a
case are no longer 'live' or the patties lack a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome,
the case becomes moot and the court no
longer has subject matter jurisdiction."
Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337,
340 (3d Cir.2004). "An offer of complete
relief will generally moot the plaintiff's
claim, as at that point the plaintiff retains no
personal interest in the outcome of the
litigation." Thus, whether or not the plaintiff
accepts the offer, no justiciable controversy
remains when a defendant tenders an offer
of judgment under Rule 68 encompassing all
the relief a plaintiff could potentially recover
at trial. We have recognized, however, that
conventional mootness principles do not fit
neatly within the representative action
paradigm.
Rule 68 was designed "to encourage
settlement and avoid litigation." Marek v.
Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5, 105 S.Ct. 3012, 87
L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). In the representative
action arena, however, Rule 68 can be
manipulated to frustrate rather than to serve
these salutary ends. Exploring this deviation
from Rule 68's purposes, the Supreme Court
has noted:
Requiring multiple plaintiffs to bring
separate actions, which effectively
could be 'picked off' by a
defendant's tender of judgment
before an affirmative ruling on class
certification could be obtained,
obviously would frustrate the
objectives of class actions; moreover
it would invite waste of judicial

resources by stimulating successive
suits brought by others claiming
aggrievement.
Deposit G1Iar. Nat'! Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S.
326, 339 (1980).
We addressed the tension between Rules 23
and 68 in Weiss. There, the named plaintiff
filed a federal class action complaint
alleging violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692,
and, prior to moving for class certification,
received a Rule 68 offer of judgment in full
satisfaction of the individual relief sought.
The plaintiff rejected the offer, and the court
granted the defendants' 12(b)(1) motion to
dismiss the complaint on mootness grounds.
On appeal, we explored the applicability of
the "relation back" doctrine to a scenario in
which the defendants' "tactic of picking off'
lead plaintiffs with a Rule 68 offer ... may
deprive a representative plaintiff the
opportunity to timely bring a class
certification motion, and also may deny the
court a reasonable opportunity to rule on the
motion." 385 F.3d at 347. Finding
application of the doctrine necessary to
vindicate the policy aims inherent in Rule
23, we held that, "[a]bsent undue delay in
filing a motion for class certification . . .
where a defendant makes a Rule 68 offer to
an individual claim that has the effect of
mooting possible class relief asserted in the
complaint, the appropriate course is to relate
the certification motion back to the filing of
the class complaint." As there had been no
undue delay, we reversed and directed the
district court to allow the plaintiff to file a
class certification motion that would "relate
back" to the filing of the complaint.
In essence, the relation back doctrine allows
a district COUlt to retain jurisdiction over a
matter that would appear susceptible to
dismissal on mootness grounds by viliue of
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the expiration of a named plaintiff's
individual claims. In Sosna v. lmva, 419
U.S. 393, 401 (1975), the Supreme Court
found federal court jurisdiction to adjudicate
a live controversy between members of a
certified Rule 23 class and a named
defendant was not extinguished by the
named plaintiff's claim becoming moot
before the district court reached the merits
of the case. Addressing the possibility that
resolution of the controversy as to the
named plaintiffs may occur "before the
district comi can reasonably be expected to
rule on a certification motion," the Court
explained such certification "can be said to
'relate back' to the filing of the complaint"
when the issue might otherwise evade
review.
This equitable principle has evolved to
account for calculated attempts by some
defendants to short-circuit the class action
process and to prevent a putative
representative
from
reaching
the
certification stage. Certification vests a
named plaintiff with a procedural right to act
on behalf of the collective interests of the
class that exists independent of his
substantive claims. Although traditional
mootness rules would ordinarily apply
absent an affirmative ruling on class
certification, "in certain circumstances, to
give effect to the purposes of Rule 23, it is
necessary to conceive of the named plaintiff
as a part of an indivisible class and not
merely a single adverse party even before
the class certification question has been
decided." Weiss, 385 F.3d at 347. The
rationale underpinning the relation back
doctrine serves to shield from dismissal on
mootness grounds those claims vulnerable to
being "picked off' by defendants attempting
to forestall class formation. As the Seventh
Circuit has explained:
Normally, ... a class action must be

certified as such in order for it to
escape dismissal once the claims of
the named plaintiff become moot.
But the courts have recognized that
an absolute requirement would
prevent some otherwise justiciable
claims from ever being subject to
judicial review .... [J]ust as necessity
required the development of the
relation back doctrine in cases where
the underlying factual situation
naturally changes so rapidly that the
courts cannot keep up, so necessity
compels a similar result here. If the
class action device is to work, the
courts must have a reasonable
opportunity to consider and decide a
motion for celiification. If a tender
made to the individual plaintiff while
the motion for certification is
pending could prevent the cOUlis
from ever reaching the class action
issues, that oPPOItunity is at the
mercy of a defendant, even in cases
where a class action would be most
clearly appropriate.
Susman v. Lincoln Am. CO/p., 587 F.2d 866,
870 (7th Cir.1978).

When a defendant's Rule 68 offer threatens
to preempt the certification process,
reconciling the conflicting imperatives of
Rules 23 and 68 requires allocating
sufficient time for the process to "play out."
Weiss, 385 F.3d at 348. By invoking the
relation back doctrine, a court preserves its
authority to rule on a named plaintiff's
attempt to represent a class by treating a
Rule 23 motion as though it had been filed
contemporaneously with the filing of the
class complaint. Consequently, "the relation
back' principle ensures that plaintiffs can
reach the certification stage." Sandoz v.
Cingular Wireless LLC, 553 F.3d 913, 919
(5th Cir.2008).
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III.

A.
The issue we must resolve on this appeal,
then, is whether an FLSA collective action
becomes moot when (1) the putative
representative receives a Rule 68 offer in
full satisfaction of her individual claim prior
to moving for "conditional certification,"
and (2) no other potential plaintiff has opted
in to the suit. Animating our decision in
Weiss was the ability of defendants to use
Rule 68 "to thwart the putative class action
before the certification question could be
decided." 385 F.3d at 349. Symczyk cites
similar arguments in the § 216(b) context
and discerns no material distinction between
the two procedures insofar as this
consideration is concerned. By contrast,
defendants contend Weiss does not apply in
the FLSA context because a putative §
216(b) named plaintiff allegedly lacks the
"representative" status that accords a Rule
23 named plaintiff a personal stake in the
matter sufficient to confer continued Alticle
III jurisdiction once his individual claim has
been mooted. We believe the considerations
warranting application of the relation back
doctrine to Rule 23 class actions also apply
to § 216(b) collective actions.
In support of their effort to confine Weiss to
the class action setting, defendants rely
principally on the dissimilar roles played by
Rule 23 and § 216(b) named plaintiffs. As
noted, the statutory form of aggregation
provided for in the FLSA requires each
party plaintiff affirmatively to opt in to a
collective action by filing a consent form "in
the court in which such action is brought."
29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Whereas a member ofa
celtified class in a Rule 23(b )(3) proceeding
will be bound by judgment unless he has
intentionally opted out of the suit, resolution
of a § 216(b) collective action will not bind

any similarly situated employee absent his
express, written consent. Defendants argue a
§ 216(b) named plaintiff whose individual
claim has been mooted by a Rule 68 offer
before anyone has opted in to the action
cannot purport to possess a personal stake in
representing the interests of others.
Although defendants' logic has some
surface appeal, reliance on the watershed
event of an opt-in to trigger application of
the special mootness rules that prevail in the
representative action context incentivizes the
undesirable strategic use of Rule 68 that
prompted our holding in Weiss. As the
Supreme Court explained in Hoffmann-La
Roche, actualization of § 216(b)' s purposes
often necessitates a district court's
engagement at the notice phase of the
proceeding. 493 U.S. at 170-71, 110 S.Ct.
482. When a defendant's Rule 68 offer
arrives before the court has had an
opportunity to determine whether a named
plaintiff has satisfied his burden at this
threshold stage, and the COUlt has therefore
refrained from overseeing the provision of
notice to potential patty plaintiffs, it is not
surprising to find the offer has also preceded
the arrival of any consent forms from
prospective opt-ins. If our mootness inquiry
in the § 216(b) context were predicated
inflexibly on whether any employee has
opted in to an action at the moment a named
plaintiff receives a Rule 68 offer, employers
would have little difficulty preventing FLSA
plaintiffs from attaining the "representative"
status necessary to render an action
justiciable notwithstanding the mooting of
their individual claims.
In Sandoz, the only court of appeals'
decision to address the applicability of the
relation back doctrine in the FLSA context,
the Fifth Circuit concluded Congress did not
intend, through the enactment of § 216(b), to
create an "anomaly" by allowing employers
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"to use Rule 68 as a sword, 'picking off'
representative plaintiffs and avoiding ever
having to face a collective action." 553 F.3d
at 919. The court elaborated:
[T]he differences between class
actions and FLSA § 2 I 6(b)
collective actions do not compel a
different result regarding whether a
certification motion can "relate
back" to the filing of the complaint.
The status of a case as being an "opt
in" or "opt out" class action has no
bearing on whether a defendant can
unilaterally moot a plaintiff's case
through a Rule 68 offer of judgment.
Although the differences between
Rule 23 class actions and FLSA §
216(b) collective actions alter the
conceptual mootness inquiry, each
type of action would be rendered a
nullity if defendants could simply
moot the claims as soon as the
representative plaintiff files suit.
Thus, the policies behind applying
the "relation back" principle for Rule
23 class actions apply with equal
force to FLSA § 216(b) collective
actions.

the manner in which a named plaintiff
acquires a personal stake in representing the
interests of others, it does not present a
compelling justification for limiting the
relation back doctrine to the Rule 23 setting.
The considerations that caution against
allowing a defendant's use of Rule 68 to
impede the advancement of a representative
action are equally weighty in either context.
Rule 23 permits plaintiffs "to pool claims
which would be uneconomical to litigate
individually." Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809, 105 S.Ct. 2965,
86 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985). Similarly, § 2l6(b)
affords plaintiffs "the advantage of lower
individual costs to vindicate rights by the
pooling of resources." Hoffmann- La Roche,
493 U.S. at 170. Rule 23 promotes
"efficiency and economy of litigation."
Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S.
345, 349 (1983). Similarly, "Congress'
purpose in authorizing § 216(b) class actions
was to avoid multiple lawsuits where
numerous employees have allegedly been
harmed by a claimed violation or violations
of the FLSA by a particular employer."
Prickett v. DeKalb Cnty., 349 F.3d 1294,
1297 (11th Cir.2003).

There, the defendant tendered its offer of
judgment approximately one month after
Sandoz had commenced her FLSA action,
and Sandoz waited thirteen months after
filing her complaint to move for
"conditional
certification."
Borrowing
language from Weiss and holding that
"relation back is warranted only when the
plaintiff files for certification without undue
delay,'" the Fifth Circuit remanded for the
district court to consider whether Sandoz
had "timely sought certification of her
collective action." ....

When Rule 68 morphs into a tool for the
strategic cmiailment of representative
actions, it facilitates an outcome antithetical
to the purposes behind § 216(b). Symczyk's
claim-like that of the plaintiff in Weisswas "acutely susceptible to mootness" while
the action was in its early stages and the
court had yet to determine whether to
facilitate notice to prospective plaintiffs.
When the certification process has yet to
unfold, application of the relation back
doctrine prevents defendants from using
Rule 68 to "undercut the viability" of either'
type of representative action.

B.

c.

Although the opt-in mechanism transforms

Additionally,

the relation back doctrine
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helps safeguard against the erosion of FLSA
claims by operation of the Act's statute of
limitations. To qualify for relief under the
FLSA, a patty plaintiff must "commence"
his cause of action before the statute of
limitations applying to his individual claim
has lapsed. Sperling v. Hoffinann-La Roche,
Inc., 24 F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir.1994). For a
named plaintiff, the action commences on
the date the complaint is filed. 29 U.S.c. §
256(a). For an opt-in plaintiff, however, the
action commences only upon filing of a
written consent. Id. § 256(b). This represents
a depatture from Rule 23, in which the filing
of a complaint tolls the statute of limitations
"as to all asserted members of the class"
even if the putative class member is not
cognizant of the suit's existence. Protracted
disputes over the propriety of dismissal in
light of Rule 68 offers may deprive potential
opt-ins whose claims are in jeopardy of
expiring of the opportunity to toll the
limitations period-and preserve their
entitlements to recovery-by filing consents
within the prescribed window.
D.

In sum, we believe the relation back doctrine
helps ensure the use of Rule 68 does not
prevent a collective action fi'om playing out
according to the directives of § 216(b) and
the procedures authorized by the Supreme
Court in Hoffmann-La Roche and further
refined by courts applying this statute.
Depriving the parties and the court of a
reasonable opportunity to deliberate on the
merits of collective action "conditional
certification" frustrates the objectives served
by § 216(b). Absent undue delay, when an
FLSA plaintiff moves for "certification" of a

collective action, the appropriate courseparticularly when a defendant makes a Rule
68 offer to the plaintiff that would have the
possible effect of mooting the claim for
collective relief asserted under § 216(b )-is
for the district court to relate the motion
back to the filing of the initial complaint.
Upon remand, should Symczyk move for
"conditional certification," the court' shall
consider whether such motion was made
without undue delay, and, if it so finds, shall
relate the motion back to December 4,
2009-the date on which Symczyk filed her
initial complaint. If (1) Symczyk may yet
timely seek "conditional certification" of her
collective action, (2) the COUlt permits the
case to move forward as a collective action
(by virtue of Symczyk's satisfaction of the
"modest factual showing" standard), and (3)
at least one other similarly situated
employee opts in, then defendants' Rule 68
offer of judgment would no longer fully
satisfy the claims of everyone in the
collective action, and the proffered rationale
behind dismissing the complaint on
jurisdictional grounds would no longer be
applicable. If, however, the court finds
Symczyk's motion to certify would be
untimely, or otherwise denies the motion on
its merits, then defendants' Rule 68 offer to
Symczyk-in full satisfaction of her
individual claim-would moot the action.
IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse
the judgment of the District Court and
remand for proceedings consistent with this
OpInIOn.
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"Supreme Court to Consider Whether Offer of Judgment to Named Plaintiff
Moots FLSA Collection Action, Among Other Cases"
Wolters K11lwer: Law and B1Isiness
June 25, 2012
The U.S. Supreme Court will decide
whether an employer's offer of judgment to
satisfy all claims of a lone named plaintiff in
a putative collective action wage suit renders
the case moot-and thus beyond the power
of Article III courts. On June 25, the High
COUli agreed to review Genesis Health Care
Corp v Symczyk (Docket No 11-1059), a
Third Circuit decision that revived a putative
FLSA collective action that was dismissed
below after the named plaintiff rejected the
employer's offer of judgment satisfying her
claim in full.
In the underlying case, a registered nurse
filed an FLSA suit claiming the employer
had an unlawful policy of automatically
deducting pay for meal breaks without
regard to whether employees had actually
taken their breaks. She sought to represent
similarly situated employees who were also
subjected to the auto-deduct policy but she
had not yet moved to conditionally certify a
class. In response to the complaint, the
employer made an offer of judgment to
satisfy the plaintiffs claims in full, as well

as attorneys' fees and costs, but she rejected
the settlement. The district court therefore
dismissed the action as moot.
Reversing, the Third Circuit ruled that a
Rule 68 offer of judgment did not prevent an
FLSA collective action from moving
forward. The objectives of Sec. 216(b) of
the Act would be frustrated if the parties and
the court were deprived of a reasonable
opportunity to deliberate on the merits of the
collective action prior to conditional
certification, the appeals court reasoned. The
circuit court was concerned that defendants
could wield Rule 68 as a sword to avoid
further proceedings in collective actions.
"When Rule 68 mOl'phs into a tool for the
strategic cUliailment of representative
actions, it facilitates an outcome antithetical
to the purposes behind Sec. 216(b),"
according to the appeals court. In petitioning
the Supreme Court, however, the employer
argued that "the willingness of lower courts
to elevate ungrounded policy concerns over
Article III principles warrants this Court's
immediate attention." ...
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"Employers Cannot 'Pick Off' Plaintiff
to End Case Early"
Pittsburg Post Gazette
September 2, 2011
Shannon P. Duffy
When an employer is hit with a proposed
collective action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, it cannot "pick off' the lead
plaintiff by making an offer of judgment that
moots the claim before any other workers
have the chance to "opt in" to the case, a
judicial panel has ruled.
In Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare Corp.,
three judges from the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals
unanimously held
that
defendants in collective actions cannot
strategically use an offer of judgment under
Rule 68 to end such a case at the outset.
U.S. Circuit Court Judge Anthony 1. Scirica
found that Rule 68 was designed to
"encourage settlement and avoid litigation,"
but that "in the representative action arena,
however, Rule 68 can be manipulated to
frustrate rather than to serve these salutary
ends."
In the suit, lead plaintiff Laura Symczyk, a
registered nurse in Philadelphia, claimed
that Genesis HeaIthCare violated the FLSA
when it implemented a policy that imposed
an automatic meal break deduction
regardless of whether workers had
performed compensable work during their
breaks.

an answer to the complaint and serving the
plaintiff with a Rule 68 offer of judgment
for $7,500-the full amount of Ms.
Symczyk's alleged unpaid wages-plus
attorney fees and costs to be "determined by
the court."
Ms. Symczyk objected, claiming the defense
was making a strategic attempt to "pick off'
the named plaintiff before the court could
consider her certification motion.
But Judge Baylson sided with the defense,
saying that since no other workers had yet
opted in, the Rule 68 offer had effectively
mooted the case.
Now the 3rd Circuit has ruled that Judge
Baylson should have employed the "relation
back" doctrine to allow the plaintiff to file a
motion for certification of the collective
action as if it had been filed at the time the
suit began.
"When Rule 68 mOl'phs into a tool for the
strategic curtailment of representative
actions, it facilitates an outcome antithetical
to the purposes behind" the FLSA, Judge
Scirica wrote in an opinion joined by Judges
Thomas L. Ambro and Thomas I. Vanaskie.

U.S. District Judge Michael M. Baylson
ordered that the plaintiff would have 90 days
to conduct initial discovery before filing her
motion to have the case certified as a
collective action.

The relation back doctrine, Judge Scirica
said, "allows a district comi to retain
jurisdiction over a matter that would appear
susceptible to dismissal on mootness
grounds by viliue of the expiration of a
named plaintiffs individual claims."

But defense lawyers moved quickly by filing

As an "equitable principle," Scirica said, the
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doctrine "has evolved to account for
calculated attempts by some defendants to
shOli-circuit the class action process and to
prevent a putative representative from
reaching the certification stage."
The 3rd Circuit first applied the relation
back doctrine in its 2004 decision in Weiss
v. Regal Collections, holding that a Rule 68
offer could not be used to end a class action.
Now the 3rd Circuit has extended the
holding in Weiss to encompass collective
actions.
Genesis HealthCare's lawyer, James N.
Boudreau of Greenberg Traurig, argued that
Weiss should be confined to the class action
setting because there are key differences
between class actions and collective actions.
Unlike a member of a class, Mr. Boudreau
argued, a named plaintiff in a collective
action whose individual claim has been
mooted by a Rule 68 offer before anyone
else has opted in cannot purport to possess a
personal stake in representing the interests

of others.
Judge Scirica disagreed, saying "reliance on
the watershed event of an opt-in to trigger
application of the special mootness lUles that
prevail in the representative action context
incentivizes the undesirable strategic use of
Rule 68 that prompted our holding in
Weiss."
If courts employed an inflexible approach
that required others to opt in to avoid the
mootness that results from a Rule 68 offer,
Judge Scirica said, "employers would have
little difficulty preventing FLSA plaintiffs
from attaining the 'representative' status
necessary to render an action justiciable
notwithstanding the mooting of their
individual claims."
Mr. Boudreau declined to comment on the
lUling.
Plaintiffs attorney Gary F. Lynch of Carlson
Lynch in New Castle, Pa., could not be
reached for comment.
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